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November, 2005 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The marijuana industry is of interest to economists for several reasons.  First, 
although official data are lacking, the available estimates indicate that the industry is of 
substantial size.  For example, about one-third of all Australians admit to having tried it, and 
a much larger proportion of young people have done so (see National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey, various issues, for details).  Additionally, Clements and Daryal (2005a) 
estimate that expenditure on marijuana is about three-quarters of beer sales and twice wine 
sales.  Although these estimates are subject to considerable uncertainties, all the indications 
are that the marijuana sector is of sufficient size to merit careful investigation. 
A second reason making the economics of marijuana of interest is that it forms the 
basis of appealing teaching material, possibly because young people tend to be the more 
intensive users, and because its illicit nature endows marijuana with some form of edgy 
mystique that captures the imagination of students.  Marijuana provides nice examples for 
lively classroom discussions of demand analysis (what are the substitutes for marijuana and 
what is its price elasticity of demand?); the demand and supply model (the effects of 
legalisation of marijuana on the price and quantity transacted); the role of technological 
change in lowering prices to consumers (the switch to hydroponics techniques for growing 
marijuana in the 1990s); and the economics of packaging (why are there substantial 
discounts for bulk purchases of marijuana?).   
A third reason for interest in marijuana relates to public finance issues.  As its 
production and consumption are illegal, marijuana escapes the tax net.  Can producers of 
alcoholic beverages -- substitutes for marijuana -- legitimately argue that on the basis of 
competitive neutrality, marijuana should be legalised and taxed in a similar manner to them?  
If so, exactly how should marijuana be taxed?  The possibilities include a uniform rate 
applied to marijuana and alcohol; Ramsey optimal taxes that balance revenue requirements 
with deadweight losses; and using taxes to correct any externalities in consumption.  There 
are also related public policy issues associated with marijuana: Exactly what are the health 
consequences of marijuana usage and to what extent are these external effects justifying 
policy intervention?  What is the case for regulating consumption and what are the least-cost 
policy instruments? 
Finally, the illicit nature of marijuana presents both intriguing challenges and 
opportunities for research.  As producers and consumers have incentives to conceal their 
activities, information on the marijuana industry is not readily available and has to be 
complied using unconventional and indirect methods and sources.  The criminal aspect of  
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marijuana opens up research possibilities regarding the impact of expected penalties on 
consumption, issues of asymmetric information about product quality, risk-return tradeoffs, 
etc.  We could also usefully ask, can conventional microeconomic analysis be applied to 
marijuana that is not only illicit, but also has mind-altering effects on users?  In this sense, 
the economic analysis of marijuana can be viewed as a form of “stress-testing” of theory. 
This paper provides an overview of economic dimensions of the marijuana industry 
and in a number of ways, compares and contrasts economic characteristics of marijuana with 
other products.  This comparison involves the following elements: 
•  We compare consumption patterns of marijuana with those of alcohol, tobacco and 
other drugs to reveal interesting similarities and differences.  For example, it is likely 
that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes in consumption, so that policies that serve 
to reduce marijuana usage by increasing its price (such as a police crackdown on 
production), would be likely to encourage drinking.  A further example is that to a 
first approximation at least, the price sensitivity of the demand for marijuana is the 
same as that of beer, wine and spirits -- each of these products has a price elasticity 
of about minus one-half.  
•  An analysis of marijuana prices in different regions of Australia reveals a surprising 
degree of dispersion which is much larger than that of regional incomes, but of the 
same order as the dispersion of house prices.  This finding points to the importance 
of local processing and distribution costs, in addition to the cost of the “raw” 
product, in determining marijuana prices.   
•  Over time, the relative price of marijuana has fallen substantially, much faster than 
the prices of many other primary products which tend to fall at about 1-2 percent     
p. a. on average.  We argue that this fall in prices is likely to be due to part of the 
benefits of productivity improvement in the growing of marijuana (associated with 
the adoption of hydroponic techniques) and/or a softening of community attitudes to 
marijuana usage that has lead, in one way or another, to a lowering of the risk of 
incurring substantial criminal penalties.   
•  The unit price of marijuana declines by as much as 50 percent when purchased in the 
form of an ounce rather than a gram.  We show that once this discount is formulated 
in a manner that is comparable across widely different types of products (in the form 
of what we call the “discount elasticity”), it is more or less the same as that available 
for grocery products, as well as other illicit drugs.  This leads to the elegantly simple 
pricing rule that a 10 percent rise in the package size of a product is associated with a  
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2.5 percent reduction in the unit price.  That such a pricing rule applies to a number 
of products in addition to marijuana seems to reflect the same basic economic forces 
at work in a variety of different situations. 
•  In the late 1990s, taxation of alcohol and tobacco consumption in Australia generated 
almost $700 per capita p. a.  If marijuana were legalised and subject to taxation, the 
revenue-maximising rate of about 50 percent would increase tax collections by 
roughly $95 per capita, or 14 percent. 
Thus while marijuana does have some unique characteristics associated with its illicit status, 
these do not seem to be sufficient to put the product in a special category requiring special 
treatment for the purposes of economic analysis. 
The structure of the paper is as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 present detailed empirical 
evidence from nationally-representative drug surveys on marijuana consumption patterns, as 
well as econometric analyses of the socioeconomic determinants of marijuana consumption.  
The identification of those groups in society who have a high propensity to use marijuana is 
valuable for designing better-targeted drug education programs.  We also investigate in 
Section 3 the correlation between marijuana usage and that of other legal and illegal drugs, 
emphasising the importance of cross-drug relationships via unobservable personal 
characteristics.  Such information could help to understand the indirect effects of an 
education campaign or policy pertaining to one drug within a multi-drug context.  The next 
two sections of the paper -- Sections 4 and 5 -- discuss intriguing patterns in marijuana 
prices, viz., pronounced regional price differences, the substantial fall in prices over time 
and quantity discounts.  Sections 6 and 7 deal with the price sensitivity of marijuana 
consumption, and its interrelationship with drinking patterns.  We then turn in Sections 8 
and 9 to something a bit more speculative, the likely impacts of the legalisation of marijuana 
consumption.  This material includes survey information on the possible changes in 
marijuana usage, as well as the indirect effects on usage of substitute products, alcoholic 
beverages.  We also investigate the possibilities afforded by legalisation for the government 







2.  WHO USES MARIJUANA? 
 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of marijuana consumption patterns in 
Australia.  An econometric analysis of these patterns is carried out in the subsequent section.  
We commence with a description of data sources.  
The most comprehensive data source in Australia for individuals’ consumption of 
recreational drugs is the National Drug Strategy Household Surveys (NDSHS).  These are 
nationally representative surveys of the non-institutionalised civilian population aged 14 and 
above in Australian households, and contain information on individuals’ knowledge, attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to drugs. The NDSHS have been conducted eight times since 1985, the 
latest referring to 2004.  Households were selected by a multi-stage, stratified area sample 
design to provide a random sample within each geographical stratum.  Once a household was 
contacted, the respondent selected was the person with the next birthday.  While the earlier 
surveys covered a few thousand individuals each time, almost 30,000 people were involved in 
each of the 2001 and 2004 surveys.  The questionnaire used has also become more and more 
comprehensive over the years, with many more questions added to more recent surveys.  More 
rigorous measures have also been put in place in the more recent surveys to ensure 
confidentiality and to reduce under reporting.  For example, in the last two surveys in 2001 and 
2004, the self-completed “drop-and-collect” method and the computer-assisted telephone 
interview method were employed.  
Recent Trends 
According to the most recent NDSHS conducted in 2004 (AIHW, 2005), 11.3  percent of 
the respondents have used marijuana at least once in the past 12 months and the average age at 
which the Australians first used marijuana is 18.7 years old.  Around one-fifth (20.6 percent) of 
the population said they were offered or had the opportunity to use marijuana in the 12 months 
preceding the survey.  This availability measure is lower than the 24.2 percent in the 2001 
survey.  Support for the legalisation of marijuana has decreased, with 27.0 percent of the 
population (or 30 percent of males and 24 percent of females) in support in 2004, compared to 
the 29.1 percent in 2001.  Interestingly, support for tougher penalties for the sale or supply of 
marijuana has also decreased slightly from 61.1 percent in 2001 to 58.2 percent in 2004. 
Table 2.1 gives the participation rates for marijuana and several other legal and illegal 
drugs from the five surveys since 1993.  As can be seen in the first row, about one-third of the 
population said they have tried or used marijuana at some time of their life, and this percentage  
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has fluctuated only slightly in the past ten years.  The figures in the second row give the 
prevalence of recent/current usage of marijuana.  The percentage of Australians who used 
marijuana in the preceding 12 months declined to below 12 percent for the first time in 2004.  
As can be seen from the other rows of Table 2.1, participation rates for other illicit drugs are 
much lower than that for marijuana.  Non-medical uses of speed (meth/amphetamine) and 
ecstasy (“designer drugs”) are the next popular, with participation rates rising over the past 
decade.  Over 3 percent used either speed or ecstasy during the previous 12 months in 2004.  
The prevalence rates for heroin and cocaine have declined since 1998, which may in part be due 
to the “heroin drought” experienced in Australia since late 2000, caused by a shortage in world 
supply relating to opium production in Afghanistan and the crackdown on several major 
trafficking groups supplying Australia.  
Being legal, tobacco and alcohol are the most commonly used recreational drugs. The 
trends over time of participation rates for tobacco and alcohol, together with that of marijuana, 
are plotted in Figure 2.1.  One in five Australians smoked cigarettes in 2004, but smoking has 
decreased by a significant 4 percentage points since 1998.  On the other hand, more Australians 
are drinking alcohol, with the percentage drinking having increased over the past decade by 10 
percentage points.  These trends contrast the slight fall for marijuana participation, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. Participation rates for all drugs for 2004 are depicted in Figure 2.2. 
Socioeconomic Characteristics of Marijuana Users 
The NDSHS collected detailed information on socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics of individual respondents, allowing us to study the correlations between 
individuals’ drug-related behaviour and personal characteristics.  Such information is invaluable 
for highlighting important factors relating to drug taking behaviour and identifying more 
vulnerable groups.  This is crucial to the effective design and implementation of well-targeted 
public health and drug education programs and policies.  In what follows, we present descriptive 
statistics on the various socioeconomic and demographic aspects of marijuana consumption.  
Unfortunately at the time of writing this paper, only the major summary statistics from the 2004 
survey have been published, but the unit-record data have not been released, which prevents a 
more detailed analysis of the most recent data.  Pooled data from the 1998 and 2001 surveys are 
used that involves over 36,000 individuals in the combined sample. We first look at the 
participation in marijuana usage, which relates to a binary “yes/no” type of variable, before 
turning to the frequency of consumption for users who have consumed marijuana in the 12 
months prior to the surveys.  For simplicity, we shall refer to the frequency of consumption as  
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the “level” of consumption, but it is to be understood that the two concepts coincide only if the 
quantity consumed each time remains unchanged. 
Marijuana Participation 
Table 2.2 presents marijuana participation rates by socio-economic and demographic 
groups, as well as the same measure for several other licit and illicit drugs. It highlights the 
differences in marijuana prevalence by factors such as gender, education and income. These 
differences are also illustrated in Figure 2.3.
1  As can be seen, while marijuana participation 
among the overall Australian population is 14.4 percent, 17.1 percent of males and 12.4 percent 
of females use marijuana.  Single individuals (22.1 percent) are significantly more likely to have 
used marijuana in the past 12 months than the married or de facto partnered (8.6 percent).  In 
terms of the main activity, the group comprising those who are retired, pensioners or have home 
duties have a significantly lower participation rate (5.9 percent) than those who work (16.4 
percent), study (24.9 percent), or who are unemployed (28.8 percent).  The prevalence rates for 
different education levels show that those with a year-12 education have a higher chance of 
using marijuana (over 19 percent) than those with different levels of education (between 12.3 
percent and 14.5 percent).  
An individual is also more likely to participate if he/she is of Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander (ATSI) origin and lives in a capital city.  A single-parent with dependent child/children 
has a 25.4 percent chance of being a recent marijuana user, as compared to the 13.7 percent for 
the rest.  In terms of personal income, low-income individuals with annual income between 
$20,000 and $30,000 show the highest participation rate relative to those with higher income or 
people with very low income.  For incomes beyond $30,000, the higher the personal income, the 
less likely a person is to use marijuana.  The relationship between the participation and age is 
illustrated in Panel C of Figure 2.3. Young Australians between the ages of 17 to 23 are most 
likely to use marijuana, with the 19-year-olds having the highest participation rate of nearly 40 
percent.  The prevalence rate beyond the age of 19 mostly declines as individuals get older. 
Next, we look at how user characteristics for other drugs compare with those for 
marijuana.  Overall, all three illicit drugs in Table 2.2 and tobacco are associated with similar 
groups, while alcohol is rather different.  Males are more likely to use all five drugs than 
                                                 
1 Note that the figures in Table 2.2 are computed using the pooled unit record data for 1998 and 2001 and refer to 
the proportions of the relevant groups who have used a particular drug in the past 12 months.  They are comparable 
to the “recently used” and “recent use” figures reported in Table 2.1 for all drugs except for tobacco and alcohol. 
The “recent use” figures for the two legal drugs in Table 2.1 refer to daily, weekly and less-than-weekly users, 




females.  Single parents are also more likely than others to use all drugs, though this occurs to a 
lesser extent for alcohol.  Single and ATSI individuals are more likely than others to use all 
drugs except alcohol.  People in capital cities are more likely to use all three illicit drugs and 
alcohol, but non-capital city residents are slightly more likely to smoke tobacco.  It is also 
interesting to compare the income relationships for the five drugs.  While marijuana and tobacco 
are clearly more likely to be associated with low income and alcohol participation is associated 
with higher income, the effects of income on cocaine and heroin usage are less straightforward.  
Heroin participation is highest among people with personal income between $40,000 and 
$50,000 and people with lower than $10,000 annual income.  On the other hand, cocaine is 
more associated with people with very high incomes of over $60,000 and those on lower middle 
incomes of between $20,000 and $40,000.  
The associations between drug participation and main activity, education and age are 
illustrated in Figure 2.4.  In terms of main activity (Panel A), unemployed individuals exhibit 
the highest participation rate for marijuana, tobacco and heroin.  Interestingly for cocaine, the 
student group has the highest participation, while those who work or are unemployed are ranked 
second highest.  In contrast to the other drugs, alcohol participation is highest among people 
who are employed, while the unemployed have the second highest participation.  
Turning to education, Panel B of Figure 2.4 shows that alcohol again exhibits a pattern 
different to the other drugs in that its participation is positively related to education attainment.  
For all four other drugs, those with a year-12 education have the highest participation rates.  
Broadly speaking, marijuana and tobacco share a similar pattern of participation in relation to 
education.  Note that for cocaine, tertiary degree holders are the second highest users after the 
year-12s.  
Lastly, we turn to participation rates by age for all five drugs, as shown in Panel C of 
Figure 2.4.  For marijuana and cocaine, participation rates are highest among young people, 
with marijuana peaking around late teens to early twenties before declining more or less steadily 
and cocaine peaking over a later and wider age range of the early to late twenties.  For heroin, 
age is less important than the other illegal drugs; while there is some volatility, the participation 
rate for heroin does not start to decline until the age of thirty-five or forty.  Turning to the legal 
drugs, participation for alcohol is more of less steady after the age of twenty and only starts to 
decline slowly after the age of forty-five.  For tobacco, the highest participation rate is for the 
twenty to thirty age group, then there is a slight decline for the thirty to forty age group, before a 




The Level of Marijuana Consumption 
For respondents who have used marijuana in the preceding 12 months, the survey also 
asks for information about the frequency of consumption.  This information is important as 
individuals using marijuana once or twice a year are very different from those using everyday in 
terms of both health consequence and targeting drug education programs.  Table 2.3 presents the 
observed  percentages for different levels (frequencies, to be precise) of marijuana participation 
for the whole sample, as well as by gender, main activity, education, socioeconomic and 
demographic groups, using the combined data of 1998 and 2001.  Figure 2.5 presents 
graphically some of this information, as well as frequency of consumption by age.   
As indicated in Table 2.3, 85.6 percent of individuals have not used marijuana over the 
past 12 months.  Within the 100 - 85.6 = 14.4 percent who have used marijuana, 2.3 percent of 
the population use every day, 3.4 percent use less than daily but at least once a week, 1.9 
percent use less frequently than every week but at least once a month, and 6.9 percent use less 
frequently than monthly but at least once in the past 12 months.  Men are more likely to be in all 
levels of consumption than women, particularly for the heavy usage categories.  Non-partnered 
individuals have higher proportions in all levels of consumption than married or de facto 
partnered.  In terms of main activity, unemployed individuals are significantly over-represented 
in all four levels of usage especially the heavy user groups.  It is also interesting to observe that 
while students have much higher participation rate than the employed (Table 2.2), employed 
individuals show a higher propensity for daily consumption than students.  In terms of the 
highest achieved education level, individuals with a year-12 education are more likely than 
others to be users at all levels of marijuana consumption.  Individuals with a non-tertiary 
diploma or trade certificate have the second highest proportions for the heavy consumption 
levels of weekly and daily.  The results for the tertiary-educated group are interesting.  With 
respect to infrequent and monthly use, people with degrees have higher marijuana participation 
rates than the group at the other end of the education scale, those with less than a year-12 
education.  But the reverse is true for weekly and daily use -- degree holder users are mostly 
infrequent users and they have a significantly lower chance than others of being daily users.  
Panel E of Figure 2.5 illustrates the relationship between the levels of marijuana 
participation and income.  The prevalence of infrequent use does not vary greatly with income, 
with people earning $20,000 to $50,000 p. a. having a slightly higher probability of being such a 
user.  However, there seems to be a clear pattern for the weekly and daily categories whereby 
the proportion of users decreases as income rises beyond $20,000.  Low income earners 
receiving between $10,000 and $30,000 have the highest probability of being daily users.      
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Finally, turning to the relationship between consumption levels and age in Panel F of Figure 2.5, 
there seems to be a sharp peak around the 19 years of age for the proportion of infrequent usage, 
which then declines more or less consistently as age increases. However, for the frequent-usage 
categories, the consumption profiles are flatter and seem to plateau over the whole age range of 
late teens to mid-late twenties. 
Marijuana and Other Drugs 
Anecdotal observation suggests that marijuana consumption is closely related to other 
recreational drugs.  For example, marijuana is frequently mixed with tobacco to smoke.  In the 
minds of consumers, other drugs and marijuana may satisfy similar needs.   In this sub-section, 
we present empirical evidence in the form of cross-drug descriptive statistics using data from 
the NDSHS.  This allows us to quantify the intrinsic relationships between the consumption of 
marijuana and other legal and illegal recreational drugs.  We first analyse the relationship 
between marijuana and the two legal drugs, tobacco and alcohol, and then turn to marijuana, 
cocaine and heroin. 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present the sample frequencies and the estimated conditional and 
unconditional probabilities of the joint consumption patterns of marijuana, alcohol and tobacco.  
Column 5 of Table 2.4 shows that whilst 14.2 percent of the total population is estimated to 
have participated in marijuana consumption, 0.3+6.0+7.7=14.0 percent use marijuana in 
conjunction with tobacco and/or alcohol, and only 0.2 percent use marijuana by itself.  The 
estimated conditional and unconditional probabilities in Table 2.5, based on the information in 
Table 2.4, highlight the correlations across the three drugs. These probabilities show that the 
chance of an individual participating in marijuana consumption is much higher if he or she is 
known to be also participating in one of the other two drugs.  For example, the chance of 
marijuana participation is 14.2 percent for the general Australian population (first entry of 
column 2 of Table 2.5), but this probability increases to 16.5 percent among alcohol drinkers 
(third entry of this column) and to 33.8 percent among the group of tobacco smokers (last entry 
of this column).  On the other hand, while 23.7 percent of the general population smoke 
tobacco, the percentage of tobacco smokers among marijuana users is much higher at 56.3 
percent (column 4). These results confirm the anecdotal observation that marijuana is closely 
related to tobacco and alcohol in consumption. 
The NDSHS data also indicate a close relationship between marijuana consumption and 
that of other illegal drugs.  For example, Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show even stronger correlations 
between the consumption of marijuana, cocaine and heroin.  From column 2 of Table 2.7, while  
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14.6 percent of individuals use marijuana, 86.2 percent of cocaine users and 90.1 percent of 
heroin users also consume marijuana.  If an individual is known to use both cocaine and heroin, 
he/she is almost certainly a marijuana user with a probably of 94.8 percent, much higher than 
the unconditional probability of 14.6 percent.  Similarly, while only 1.4 percent of the general 
population uses cocaine, the chance of cocaine use increases to 8.0 percent for the group of 
marijuana users, and to 66.9 percent among those who use both marijuana and heroin (column 3 
of Table 2.7). 
 
3. A MICROECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF  
MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION 
 
In the previous section, we analysed some of the observed sample descriptive statistics 
pertaining to the correlations between marijuana consumption and socioeconomic and 
demographic factors, and between the usage of marijuana and other drugs, both legal and illegal.  
However, as personal characteristics are often correlated, descriptive statistics such as those 
presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 cannot isolate the effects of individual factors on drug-taking 
behaviour and can sometimes even be misleading.  For example, while we observe a 
significantly higher marijuana participation rate among the unemployed, it is often the case that 
these individuals also have lower levels of education, lower incomes, are single, and perhaps are 
of an ATSI background.  So the observed high prevalence among the unemployed may be partly 
due to the effects of these other factors, rather than being unemployed per se.  Econometric 
models allow us to distinguish between the total and partial effects, so that the observed 
differences in participation can be uniquely attributed to the individual characteristics. 
Similarly, while we observe high correlations between marijuana and other drugs 
through the conditional and unconditional frequencies in Tables 2.5 and 2.7, some of these may 
be explained by underlying common factors relating to observable personal characteristics (such 
as education levels) or prices, while others may be due to unobservable characteristics such as 
those related to addictive personalities.  By their very nature, these unobserved factors are 
difficult to quantify, but can play a major role in an individual’s decision to use drugs.  For 
example, if we know that an individual is a 20-year-old single male who is unemployed, the 
chance of his using marijuana in a year and location where the marijuana price is cheap is higher 
than that of an average Australian at a time and location of low marijuana prices.  However, if 
we also know that he is using both cocaine and heroin, we would predict an even higher 
probability for his use of marijuana.  As indicated below, a multivariate econometric model,  
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comprising a system of related equations, allows us to examine the extent to which the cross-
drug correlations can be explained by observed personal characteristics, and the extent to which 
these correlations are due to unobservable factors, after controlling for differences in 
individuals’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.
2  
In this section, we present econometric approaches to the analysis of marijuana 
consumption.  In the first sub-section, we decompose the impact of a number of determinants of 
consumption by presenting the marginal effect of each individual characteristic on the 
probability of marijuana participation, controlling for all other factors, using a probit model.  In 
the next sub-section, we analyse correlations between marijuana participation and that of other 
drugs due to unobservable factors, controlling for observable personal characteristics, using 
multivariate probit models.  In the third and final sub-section, we move our focus to different 
levels of marijuana consumption, and investigate the partial effects of individual covariates on 
the probabilities of various levels of consumption, using a sequential ordered probit model.  
Throughout, we use the Australian National Drug Strategy Household Surveys (NHDSS), 
discussed in the previous section. 
Modelling Marijuana Participation 
Ramful and Zhao (2004) estimated a probit model that relates the probability of 
marijuana participation to individual socioeconomic and demographic characteristics and drug 
prices, using pooled data from the two surveys of 1998 and 2001.  Table 3.1 presents the 
estimated coefficients of the model and the corresponding marginal effects on participation of 
the individual covariates.  The marginal effects show that, holding all other explanatory 
variables fixed at sample means, Australian males are 4.7 percent more likely to have recently 
used marijuana than females.  All other factors being equal, married or de facto partnered 
individuals have 6.9 percent lower probability of using marijuana relative to those without a 
partner.  It is interesting to compare this marginal effect with the observed sample statistics in 
Table 2.2:  The observed frequency of marijuana usage in Table 2.2 for the married or partnered 
                                                 
2 Previous econometric studies of marijuana consumption are limited due to the scarcity of data on consumption 
and prices.  Many authors have used marijuana decriminalisation as a proxy in an attempt to estimate its price 
elasticity (Chaloupka et al., 1998, Farrelly et al., 2001, Model, 1993, Saffer and Chaloupka, 1998, 1999, Thies and 
Register 1993). Some have also investigated the economic relationship between marijuana and alcohol (Chaloupka 
and Laixuthai, 1997, DiNardo and Lemieux, 2001, Pacula, 1998), tobacco (Farrelly et al., 2001), and cocaine 
(Chaloupka et al., 1998, Desimone and Farrelly, 2003).  A limited number of studies, most of which have been 
conducted in the US, have investigated the demand for other psychoactive substances such as cocaine and heroin 
(Chaloupka et al., 1998, Desimone and Farrelly, 2003,  DiNardo, 1993, Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998, Petry, 
2001, Saffer and Chaloupka 1995, 1999, van Ours, 2003). In Australia, despite its extensive use and abuse, only 
limited economic research has been undertaken on marijuana consumption.  This includes Cameron and Williams 
(2001), Clements and Daryal (2005a), Williams (2004) and Zhao and Harris (2004).   
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individuals is 8.6 percent, which is more than 13 percentage points lower than that for the non-
partnered (22.1 percent).  This difference in the results points to the importance of controlling 
for other factors.  
A comparison of the marginal effects of the other explanatory variables in Table 3.1 to 
the observed sample frequencies by personal attributes in Table 2.2 further illustrates how an 
econometric model allows for the partial effects of individual factors to be isolated when other 
factors are held fixed.  Individuals with an Aboriginal or Torres Strait Island (ATSI) background 
have a marginal effect of 3.5 percent higher participation probability than the non-ATSIs, and 
single-parents are 2.3 percent more likely to use marijuana than others.  These marginal effects 
are significantly lower than the observed differences in the sample statistics in Table 2.2.  In 
terms of an individual’s main activity, only those who are unemployed have a significantly non-
zero marginal effect (4.9 percent higher probability) relative to the base group of retirees and 
homemakers, while the sample statistics of Table 2.2 show that all three groups of employed, 
students and unemployed have at least a 10 percent higher observed probability than the base 
group.  A similar pattern emerges for educational attainment -- once other factors are controlled 
for, only tertiary degree holders have a significantly different participation probability (1.3 
percent lower) in comparison with the base group of a less-than-year-12 education.  Contrast 
this with the observed probabilities of Table 2.2 that show the middle two groups of year-12 and 
diploma educated have the highest disparities from the lowest educated base group.  In fact, we 
actually observe a 1 percent higher participation rate for the degree holders relative to the base 
group, but the econometric model tells us that the marginal effect of tertiary education is 
significant and negative once other factors are controlled. 
To further illustrate the partial effects of individual explanatory variables, Figure 3.1 
gives the predicted probabilities associated with various attributes when all other factors are 
controlled for by setting them at sample means.  Comparing Figure 3.1 with the relevant parts of 
Figure 2.3 for the observed sample frequencies, it can be seen that there are obvious differences.   
Before concluding this sub-section, one final aspect of the results of Table 3.1 is worth 
mentioning.  The effect of the price of marijuana on its consumption is negative, so that this 
good obeys of the law of demand.  Additionally, the prices of heroin and cocaine both exert a 
positive influence on marijuana consumption, making them substitutes for marijuana.  Although 
the coefficient of the own price is not significantly different from zero, the two cross-price 





Correlation Across Drugs 
The cross-drug sample statistics in Tables 2.5 and 2.7 indicate close correlations 
between the participation of marijuana and tobacco, alcohol, cocaine and heroin.  Part of the 
observed correlations may be explained by the dependence of the participation probabilities on 
observed personal characteristics.  However, unobserved personal characteristics are also likely 
to play an important role in determining the correlations.  Personality traits such as those related 
to addiction are difficult to quantify, but may play a vital role in an individual’s decisions 
relating to participation in all drugs.  While it is well accepted that marijuana is closely related 
to other drugs in consumption, in studies explicitly addressing this relationship, it has mostly 
been examined through the cross-price responses of consumption (see, for example, Cameron 
and Williams, 2001). However, although the responsiveness of marijuana participation to 
changes in other drug prices has been examined previously, the correlation across decisions 
involving the use of different drugs for the same individual through unobservable characteristics 
has often been ignored.   
Studies that allowed cross-drug correlations via unobservable factors are Zhao and 
Harris (2004) and Ramful and Zhao (2004).  Ramful and Zhao (2004) estimated a trivariate 
probit model for the joint decision of participation in the three illicit drugs marijuana, cocaine 
and heroin, using pooled data from the 1998 and 2001 surveys. The trivariate approach allows 
for correlations across the error terms of all three probit equations, and then the three equations 
are estimated jointly as a system.  Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the estimated correlation 
coefficients of the errors from the model for the three illicit drugs.  These indicate that after 
accounting for the observable covariates, the correlations among the three drugs are still very 
high: 0.84 between the two hard drugs of cocaine and heroin, 0.65 between marijuana and 
cocaine, and 0.59 between marijuana and heroin, all of which are significantly different from 
zero. 
Using a similar model for marijuana, tobacco and alcohol with the combined data from 
the three NDSHS surveys of 1995, 1998 and 2001, Zhao and Harris (2004) estimated the three 
correlation coefficients after controlling for observed covariates. These are given in Panel B of 
Table 3.2.  The results show that, after accounting for the observed personal characteristics and 
prices, there are significant correlations between marijuana and the two legal drugs via 
unobserved factors, with the correlation of marijuana with tobacco being as high as 0.5. 
Knowledge of these correlations can help greatly in the prediction of an individual’s 
marijuana participation probability when knowledge of his/her participation in other drugs is 
available.  Similarly, information on marijuana participation will also help with predicting  
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probabilities of participation in other drugs.  Table 3.3 presents some predicted unconditional, 
conditional and joint probabilities using both the univariate probit (UVP) models and the 
multivariate probit models (MVP).  The UVP models ignore the cross-drug correlations via the 
unobserved error terms, while the MVP models account for such correlations.  For example, the 
left-hand part of Table 3.3 shows that not using information on the correlations, the UVP model 
implies that for an individual with personal characteristics controlled for by setting them at 
sample means, the probability of him/her being a marijuana user are predicted is 9.5 percent, 
independent of knowledge of his/her participation in other drugs.  However, when such 
correlations are accounted for using the MVP model, the predicted probability of marijuana 
usage increases to 79 percent if the person is known to be a cocaine user, while the probability 
increases still further to 87 percent if he/she is a user of both cocaine and heroin.  The right-hand 
part of Table 3.3 reports the results of applying the probit models to marijuana, alcohol and 
tobacco.  As can be seen, the predicted probability for marijuana participation for an ‘average’ 
Australian changes from 11 percent to 27 percent if the extra information is available that the 
person uses both alcohol and tobacco.  This probability decreases to only 1.5 percent if the 
person is known to be abstaining from both of the two legal drugs. 
The predicted joint probabilities are also different. Accounting for the cross-equation 
error correlations, the joint probability for an average individual with mean values of personal 
characteristics to be using marijuana, alcohol and tobacco is predicted to be 5.2 percent, while 
the univariate model predicts a mere 2.2 percent probability (see the last entries of the two 
columns on the far right of Table 3.3).  This compares to an observed frequency of 7.7 percent 
in Table 2.4 when personal characteristics are not controlled for.
3  
Consider the effect on the probably of an individual using marijuana of a change in an 
independent variable, such as the employment status of the person.  When the UVP model is 
used, this marginal effect is the same whether or not the individual uses any other drug.  That is 
to say, the UVP model implies that the marginal effect is independent of other drug usage.  But 
this is not the case with the MVP model, where the marginal effect depends on other drugs.  
This aspect of the multivariate approach is illustrated in Table 3.4 in the context of the probit 
model for marijuana, cocaine and heroin.  As can be seen, many of the marginal probabilities 
                                                 
3 Note that the predicted marginal probabilities for marijuana from the two models [(i) marijuana, cocaine and 
heroin and (ii) marijuana, alcohol and tobacco] are rather different as they use different data, from 1998-2001 for 
model (i) and 1995-2001 for model (ii).  Also note that there are sight differences in the predicted marginal 
probabilities from the UVP and MVP models.  This is due to two reasons. First, there are slight differences in the 
included sample observations as there are more missing observations for the MVP model.  Second, even though 
both models provide consistent estimates of the true marginal probability, differences can arise due to sampling 
variability.  In any event, the differences are small in magnitude.  
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change substantially as we move across the rows.  Panel A of Figure 3.2 plots the results from 
the row for “Unemployed” in Table 3.4.  This shows that with other factors held constant by 
setting them at sample means, an unemployed person is about 5 percent more likely to 
participate in marijuana consumption than the base group of retirees, pensioners and 
homemakers.  However, among heroin users, or the cocaine users, the effect of unemployment 
is to increase the probability of marijuana use by almost 10 percent.  Interestingly, in the 
subgroup of individuals who use both heroin and cocaine, the marginal effect of unemployment 
on the marijuana participation probability is slightly lower at 7 percent.  
As another example, consider the impact of marital status on marijuana usage.  Panel B 
of Figure 3.2 shows that married or de facto partnered people in general have almost a 7 percent 
lower probability of using marijuana.  But for those who are already using both heroin and 
cocaine, the marginal effect on marijuana usage of being partnered is much lower, with the 
probability being only 3.6 percent lower.  This seems to suggest that, although in general 
partnered people are much more unlikely to use marijuana in general, among serious drug users 
who use both heroin and cocaine, being married or living with a de facto partner does not reduce 
as much the chance of the person also using marijuana.  These results illustrate the extra insight 
afforded by the multivariate approach. 
Modelling the Level of Marijuana Consumption 
We now turn to the relationship between individual characteristics and the level of 
marijuana consumption.  Table 2.3 shows how the observed sample frequencies for various 
levels of marijuana consumption differ by socioeconomic and demographic groups.  However, 
as in the case of participation, an econometric model is required to isolate the partial effects of 
the individual explanatory factors when the influences of other factors are controlled for.  
Zhao and Harris (2004) studied the determinants of different levels of marijuana by 
using a sequential decision-making approach.  Individuals first decide whether or not to 
participate in consuming the illicit drug; and if they decide to participate, the decision of how 
much to consume is then made.  Zhao and Harris use a probit model for the first decision for 
participation, and an ordered probit model for the conditional probabilities in the second 
decision.  It is not unreasonable to expect that the two decisions may relate to different factors, 
or that the same explanatory variable may have different effects on the two decisions.  Estimates 
of the coefficients and marginal effects for both models for marijuana consumption are 
presented in Table 3.5.  Looking at the social and demographic effects on the two decisions, 
factors such as age, income and gender have similar effects on both decisions.  For example,  
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males are more likely to participate and also, conditional on participation, more likely to be 
consuming more frequently than females.  However, for some other explanatory variables, the 
effects on the two decisions are different or even impact in opposite directions.  Being single, 
unemployed, of ATSI background, or speaking English at home significantly increases the 
chance of participating in marijuana usage, but among the marijuana users these factors no long 
have a significant effect on how often the user consumes.  In terms of education attainment, 
higher educated people are not significantly different from the less-than-year-12 educated in 
participation; but among users of marijuana, all higher educated groups are less likely to engage 
in frequent consumption than the less-than-year-12 group. Finally, while being employed 
increases the probability of participation, people who work are less likely to be frequent users as 
compared to retirees, those with home duties or who undertake volunteer work.  Residency in a 
capital city has a significant effect for both participation and the level of consumption.  But the 
coefficients of the residency variable in the two equations have opposite signs; individuals in 
capital cities are more likely to participate, but among users, heavier smokers are more likely to 
be residing in non-capital cities.
4 
 
4.  TWO EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES IN PRICES 
 
This section deals with two intriguing empirical regularities in marijuana prices, (i) the 
distinct regional structure of prices; and (ii) the substantial fall in prices that occurred over the last 
decade.  In the next section we discuss a pattern that characterises relative marijuana prices, the 
substantial quantity discounts available for bulk purchases.  We start with a brief discussion of the 
data on prices.
5   
The Australian Bureau of Statistics do not collect marijuana prices, but the Australian 
Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) have some “unofficial” data which they generously 
provided to us.
6  These prices were elicited by law enforcement agencies in the various states 
                                                 
4 The econometric models discussed in this section can be generalised and extended in several directions.  Harris 
and Zhao (2005) argue that the large proportion of zero observations, which refer to non-participants, needs to be 
closely examined.  They propose a zero-inflated ordered probit model whereby the zeros are related to two distinct 
sources, each of which is determined by different systems of consumer behaviour.  For example, in the case of 
marijuana consumption, zeros will be recorded for genuine non-participants due to health or legal concerns.   
However, there will also be zeros for those infrequent purchasers, or potential users, who may report zero 
consumption at the time of the survey, but who may become consumers if price falls sufficiently.  Another issue 
relates to the lack of flexibility in the use of the ordered probit model.  Using a single latent equation, the ordered 
probit is restrictive in modelling different levels of consumption.  Harris et al. (forthcoming) use an ordered 
generalised extreme value model that is more flexible, while at the same time accounts for the ordered nature of the 
discrete data.  
5 This section draws on Clements (2002, 2004). 
6 An alternative source of information on drug prices in Australia is the Illicit Drug Reporting System, which is 
funded by the Commonwealth Department of Health and Ageing and coordinated by the National Drug and  
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and territories during undercover buys. In general, the data are quarterly and refer to the period 
1990-1999, for each state and territory.  The different types of marijuana identified separately 
are leaf, heads, hydroponics, skunk, hash resin and hash oil.  However, we focus on only the 
prices of leaf and heads packaged in the form of grams and ounces, as these products are the 
most popular.  The data are described in ABCI (1996) who acknowledge that there exist some 
inconsistencies with the data.  The prices are usually recorded in the form of ranges and the 
basic data are listed in Clements and Daryal (2001) who also “consolidate” and edit the data to 
eliminate outliers.  In summary, while these data are less than perfect, they are all we have.  But 
even acknowledging their problems, when we average over the individual prices, there is little 
reason to believe that the resulting indexes systematically over- or under-estimate prices in 
general.   
Regional Disparities in Prices 
Relative to weight and volume, marijuana is a high-value product, so we would expect 
transport costs to be low relative to the price.  Other things being equal, this would tend to make 
for a national marijuana market with regional prices more or less equalised.  The tradeable 
nature of marijuana would also seem to be supported by the prominent role that anecdotal 
evidence accords to Adelaide as a major exporter.  Radio National (1999) noted that: 
“Cannabis is by far and away the illicit drug of choice for Australians.  There is a 
multi billion dollar industry to supply it, and increasingly, the centre of action is the 
city of churches.” 
 
That program quoted a person called “David” as saying: 
“Say five, ten years ago, everyone spoke of the country towns of New South Wales 
and the north coast, now you never hear of it; those towns have died in this regard 
I’d say, because they’re lost out to the indoor variety, the hydro, and everyone was 
just saying South Australia, Adelaide, Adelaide, Adelaide, and that’s where it all 
seems to be coming from.” 
 
In a similar vein, the ABCI (1999, p. 18) commented on marijuana being exported from South 
Australia to other states as follows: 
“New South Wales Police reported that cannabis has been found secreted in the 
body parts of motor vehicles from South Australia… It is reported that cannabis 
originating in South Australia is transported to neighbouring jurisdictions.  South 
Australia Police reported that large amounts of cannabis are transported from South 
Australia by air, truck, hire vehicles, buses and private motor vehicles. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Alcohol Research Centre at the University of New South Wales.  These data are derived from injecting-drug users 
and surveys of experts.  For details, see http://www.health.gov.au/internet/wcms/Publishing.nsf/Content/health-
pubhlth-strateg-drugs-illicit-index.htm and http://ndarc.med.unsw.edu.au/ndarc.nsf/website/IDRS.  
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           Queensland  Police  reported  that South Australian cannabis is sold on the 
Gold Coast.  New South Wales Police reported South Australian vehicles returning 
to that state have been found carrying large amounts of cash or amphetamines, or 
both.  It also considers that the decrease in the amount of locally grown cannabis is 
the result of an increase in the quantity of South Australian cannabis in New South 
Wales. 
           The  Australian  Federal  Police  in  Canberra  reported  that  the  majority  of 
cannabis transported to the Australian Capital Territory is from the Murray Bridge 
area of South Australia…” 
In view of the above, it comes as a bit of a surprise that there are significant differences 
in marijuana prices in the different states and territories of Australia.  This is illustrated in Panel 
I of Table 4.1, which gives for the four types of marijuana the results of regressing prices on 
dummy variables for each state and territory.  In this panel, the dependent variable is  rt log p , 
where  prt  is the price of the relevant type of marijuana in region  r  (r = 1, …, 8) and year  t  (t = 
1990, …, 1999), and the coefficients measure the price relative to NSW, the base region.  Only 
two of the 28 coefficients are positive, leaf/ounce in Victoria and ACT, but these are both 
insignificantly different from zero.  The vast majority of the other coefficients are significantly 
negative, which says that marijuana prices are significantly lower in all regions relative to NSW.  
Row 4 tells us that for the product “head ounce”, the most important category, NT is the 
cheapest region with marijuana costing about 44 percent less than that in NSW.  Then comes 
WA (35 percent less), SA (34 percent), Tasmania (30 percent), Queensland (28 percent), 
Victoria (20 percent) and, finally, ACT (13 percent).  The last column of the table gives a 
measure of the dispersion of prices around those in NSW, a measure that is approximately the 
percentage standard deviation.  If prices are equalised across regions, then this measure is zero.  
But as can be seen, the standard deviation is substantially above zero, and ranges from 24 to 44 
percent. 
It is clear from the significance of the regional dummies that marijuana prices are not 
equalised nationally.  But this conclusion does raise the question of what could be the possible 
barriers to inter-regional trade that would prevent prices from being equalised?  Or to put it 
another way, what prevents an entrepreneur buying marijuana in NT and selling in NSW to 
realise a (gross) profit of more than 40 percent for head ounce?  While such a transaction is 
certainly not risk free, is it plausible for the risk premium to be more than 40 percent?  Are there 
other substantial costs to be paid that would rule out arbitraging away the price differential?  To 
what extent do the regional differences in marijuana prices reflect the cost of living in the 
location where it is sold?  Panels II and III of Table 4.1 explore this issue by using per capita  
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incomes and housing prices as proxies for regional living costs.
7  In Panel II, we regress the 
logarithm of income on seven regional dummies.  All the coefficients are negative, except those 
for the ACT.  As can be seen from the last column of Panel II, the dispersion of income 
regionally is considerably less than that of marijuana prices, roughly about one half, which 
could reflect the operation of the fiscal equalisation feature of the federal system.  Panel III 
repeats the analysis with housing prices replacing incomes, and the results in the last column 
show that the regional dispersion of housing prices is of the same order of magnitude of that of 
marijuana prices.  Figure 4.1 gives a graphical comparison of the regional dispersion of prices 
and incomes. 
To compare and contrast the prices of marijuana and housing further, Figure 4.2 plots 
the two sets of prices relative to NSW/Sydney by using the regional dummy-variable 
coefficients for head ounce (given in row 4 of Table 4.1) and those for houses (row 7 of Table 
4.1).  The broken ray from the origin has a 45
0  slope, so that as we move along the ray and get 
further away from the origin, marijuana and housing prices both fall equiproportionally relative 
to those in Sydney.  In other words, any point on the ray represents lower prices of both goods, 
but the marijuana/housing relative price is the same as that in Sydney.  A point above the ray, 
such as that for Darwin, indicates that marijuana is cheap in terms of housing in comparison to 
that in Sydney.  Next, consider Perth where marijuana is about 30 percent cheaper than Sydney, 
while the cost of housing is 55 percent below that of Sydney.  Relative to Sydney, although 
marijuana is cheap, housing is even cheaper, causing the marijuana/housing relative price to be 
higher in Perth than Sydney.  As all cities other than Darwin lie below the ray, we could say that 
relative to housing, Sydney has the country’s cheapest marijuana.  The solid line in Figure 4.2 is 
the least-squares regression line, constrained to pass through the origin.  The slope of this line is 
the elasticity of marijuana prices with respect to housing prices, estimated to be 0.59 (SE = 
0.09).  Since the observation for Darwin lies substantially above the regression line, we can say 
that marijuana prices in that city are cheap given its housing prices, or that housing is expensive 
in view of the cost of marijuana.  Among the seven non-Sydney cities, given its housing prices, 
marijuana would seem to be most overpriced, or housing most underpriced, in Hobart.  
The final interesting feature of Figure 4.2 is that it can be used to naturally divide up 
Australia into three super regions/cities: (i) NSW/Sydney -- expensive marijuana and housing.  
(ii) Victoria/Melbourne and ACT/Canberra -- moderately-priced marijuana and housing.  (iii) 
The rest -- cheap marijuana and housing. 
                                                 
7 While the Australian Bureau of Statistics publish a Consumer Price Index for each of the six capital cities, these 
indexes are not harmonised. Accordingly, the levels of the CPI cannot be compared across cities to provide 
information on the level of regional living costs.  
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The above discussion shows that to the extent that housing costs are a good proxy for 
living costs, marijuana prices are at least partially related to costs in general. As a substantial 
part of the overall price of marijuana is likely to reflect local distribution activities, which differ 
significantly across different regions, this could explain the finding that the market is not a 
national one, but a series of regional markets that are not too closely linked.  Understanding the 
pricing of marijuana is enhanced if we split the product into (i) a (nationally) traded component 
comprising mainly the “raw” product, whose price is likely to be approximately equalised in 
different regions; and (ii) a nontraded component associated with packaging and local 
distribution, the price of which is less likely to be equalised.  As such services are likely to be 
labour intensive, their prices will mainly reflect local wages which, in turn, would partly reflect 
local living costs.  The results of this sub-section could be interpreted as pointing to a surprising 
importance of the nontraded component of marijuana prices. 
A final point to note is the role of regional differences in penalties for possessing 
marijuana.  As discussed at the end of this section, there seems to be little, if any, link between 
penalties and regional price differences. 
Marijuana Has Become Substantially Cheaper 
Notwithstanding the likely importance of packaging and distribution costs, marijuana is an 
agricultural/horticultural-based product.  The real prices of many primary products exhibit a long-
term downward trend of about 1-2 percent p. a. due to the workings of Engel’s law and 
productivity growth in agriculture.  Are marijuana prices subject to a similar pattern?  In this and 
the next sub-section, we show that possibly because of a surge in productivity growth due to the 
adoption of hydroponic techniques of production and a softening of community attitudes to the use 
of marijuana, prices have fallen by much more than 1-2 percent, so that the answer to this question 
is a definitive “No”.   
Figure 4.3 plots an index of nominal marijuana prices and shows that over the course of 
the 1990s prices fell from near $600 per ounce to something like $450.
8  Figure 4.4 gives the 
path of marijuana prices in terms of the CPI and alcohol prices and, as can be seen, prices 
declined in real terms on average by either 4.9 percent p. a. or 5.7 percent, depending on which 
deflator is used.  
How do marijuana prices compare with those of other commodities?  Figure 4.5 gives 
the price changes of 24 internationally-traded commodities plus marijuana.  The striking feature 
of this graph is that marijuana prices have fallen the most by far.  The only commodity to come 
                                                 
8 This index is a weighted geometric mean of the four prices, leaf grams, leaf ounces, heads grams and heads 
ounces.  The weights are guestimates of the budget shares.  For details, see Clements (2002).  
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close is rubber, but even then its average price fall is one percentage point less than that for 
marijuana (-3.9 versus -4.9 percent p.a.)  After rubber there is a substantial drop off in the price 
declines -- palm oil –2.3 percent, rice –2.2 percent, cotton –2.0 percent, etc.  Surprisingly, the 
price of tobacco, which might be considered to be related to marijuana in both consumption and 
production, increased by 0.9 percent p.a.  Note also the minerals (aluminium, copper, lead, zinc, 
tin and silver) tend to lie in the middle of the spectrum of prices and have agricultural products 
on either side.  The declines in most of the commodity prices reflect the impact of productivity 
enhancement coupled with low income elasticities.  The mineral prices could also reflect the 
tendency of GDP to become “lighter” and less metals intensive over time. 
What about the prices of other goods that are not traded commodities?  Figure 4.6 
presents a selection of relative prices changes averaged over the period 1900 – 2000.  As is to be 
expected, labour-intensive services (such as the cost of a hotel room, a butler and a theatre 
ticket) increase in relative terms.  The prices that fall include those that are (i) predominantly 
agricultural or resource based (coffee, wine, eggs and petrol); and (ii) subject to substantial 
technological improvements in their manufacture and/or economies of scale (e.g., car, clothing, 
refrigerator, electricity).  To illustrate, consider the price of cars: According to The Economist 
(2000/01) “Henry Ford’s original Model-T, introduced in 1908, cost $850, but by 1924 only 
$265: He was using an assembly line, and, in a virtuous circle, was selling far more cars.  Over 
the century the real price of a car fell by 50 percent.”  The quality-adjusted price of a car, and 
some other goods, would have fallen even further, as recognised by The Economist (2000/01).  
If we omit the cost of phone calls as a possible outlier (as its price falls by 99.5 percent over the 
entire century!), the good whose price falls the most is electricity.  But even electricity prices 
fall by only 2.8 percent p.a., substantially below that of marijuana (4.9 percent). 
In a well-known paper, Nordhaus (1997) analyses the evolution of the price of light over 
the past 200 years.  He uses the service characteristic provided by light, illumination, which is 
measured in terms of lumens.  He notes that a “wax candle emits about 13 lumens [and] a one-
hundred-watt filament bulb about 1200 lumens”, which shows that the flow of lighting service 
from different sources of light has increased substantially with the introduction of new products.  
Nordhaus constructs an index of the true (or quality-adjusted) price of light in real terms.  This 
index falls from a value of 100 in 1800 to a mere 0.029 in 1992  (Nordhaus, 1997, Table 1.4, 
column 3), which represents an average price decline of 4.15 percent p.a., or a log-change  
( 100) ×  of -4.24 p.a.  As the real price of marijuana has an annual average log-change  ( 100) ×  
of -4.87, marijuana in terms of light on average falls by -4.87 - (-4.24) = -0.63 p.a.  If past trends 
continue, this implies that the number of years for this relative price to fall by  k 100 ×   percent  
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is  () log 1-k -0.0063 ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦, so that it would take about 35 years for the price of marijuana relative 
to light to fall by 20 percent.  In other words, as the price of marijuana relative to light is fairly 
constant, it could be argued that the production of both goods has been subject to similar 
degrees of productivity improvement. 
A final well-known example of the impact of productivity improvement on prices is the 
case of personal computers.  Berndt and Rappaport (2001, p. 268) describe the enhanced 
capabilities of PCs over the last quarter of a century in the following terms: 
“When introduced in 1976, personal computers (PCs) had only several kilobytes of 
random-access memory (RAM) and no hard disk, processed commands at speeds of 
less than 1 megahertz (MHz), yet typically cost several thousand dollars.  Today’s 
PCs have megabytes (MB) of RAM and gigabytes of hard-disk memory, process 
commands at speeds exceeding 1,000 MHz, and often cost less than $1,000.  Ever 
more powerful PC boxes have been transformed into increasingly smaller and lighter 
notebooks.” 
 
Berndt and Rappaport compute quality-adjusted price index for PCs, with quality defined in 
terms of hard-disk memory, processor speed and the amount of RAM.  Using more than 9,000 
observations on about 375 models per year, they find that for desktop PCs, prices declined over 
the period 1976-99 at an average rate of 27 percent p.a. and that the ratio of the price index in 
1976 to that in 1999 is 1,445:1.  For mobile PCs, prices declined by about 25 percent p.a. on 
average from 1983 to 1999. Although the above-documented declines in marijuana prices are 
very substantial among agricultural/horticultural commodities, they are still considerably less 
than those for PCs, which are nothing less than spectacular.  There would seem to be 
fundamental differences to the limits to productivity enhancement for commodities that are 
grown, and those that involve electronics such as computing, power generation and 
telecommunications. 
Why Did Prices Fall By So Much?   
One reason for the decline in their prices is that the growing of marijuana has been 
subject to productivity enhancement associated with the adoption of hydroponic growing 
techniques,
9 which lead to a higher-quality product containing higher THC levels.
10  F o r  
example, hydroponically-grown marijuana from northern Tasmania has been analysed as 
                                                 
9  T h e  w o r d  hydroponic  means “water working”. For details of hydroponic techniques, see, e.g., Asher and 
Edwards (1981) and Ashley’s Sister (1997). 
10 The content of the main psychoactive chemical Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) determines the potency 
and the quality of marijuana.  This is evidenced by the fact that flowers (so-called “heads” or “buds”), which 
contain more THC than leaves, are considerably more expensive.  
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containing 16 percent of THC, while that grown outdoors in the south of the state contained 
12.8 percent (ABCI, 1996).  The ease of concealment, and near-ideal growing conditions that 
produce good-quality plants, are the main reasons for the shift to hydroponic systems.   
According to the ABCI (1996),  
“Hydroponic systems are being used to grow cannabis on a relatively large scale.  
Unlike external plantations, hydroponic cultivation can be used in any region and is 
not regulated by growing seasons.  Both residential and industrial areas are used to 
establish these indoor sites.  Cellars and concealed rooms in existing residential and 
commercial properties are also used… The use of shipping containers to grow 
cannabis with hydroponic equipment has been seen in many cases.  The containers 
are sometimes buried on rural properties to reduce chances of detection.” 
 
Other anecdotal evidence also points to the rise of hydroponic activity over this period.  For 
example, according to the Yellow Pages telephone directory, in 1999 Victoria had 149 
hydroponics suppliers, NSW 115, SA 69, Queensland 59 and WA 58.  One suspects that many 
of these operations supply marijuana growers.  For a further discussion of this anecdotal 
evidence, see Clements (2002).  
A second possible reason for the decline in marijuana prices is that because of changing 
community attitudes, laws have become softer and penalties reduced. Information on the 
enforcement of marijuana laws distinguishes between (i) infringement notices issued for minor 
offences and (ii) arrests.  Table 4.2 presents the available Australian data on infringement 
notices for the three states/territories that use them, SA, NT and ACT.  As can be seen, per 
capita infringement notices have declined substantially in SA since 1996, increased in NT, first 
increased and then declined in ACT, and declined noticeably for Australia as a whole, where 
they have fallen by almost 50 percent.  This information points in the direction of a lower 
policing effort. Data on arrests and prosecution for marijuana offences are given in Table 4.3.  
Panel I shows that the arrest rate for NSW was more or less stable over the six-year period, 
while that for Victoria fell substantially due to a “redirection of police resources away from 
minor cannabis offences” (ABCI, 1998).  For Queensland, the arrest rate rose by more than 50 
percent in 1997, and then fell back to a more or less stable value, but in WA the rate fell 
markedly in 1999 with the introduction of a trial of cautioning and mandatory education to 
“reduce the resources previously used to pursue prosecutions for simple cannabis offences” 
(ABCI, 2000).  For Australia, the arrest rate fell from 342 in 1996 to 232 in 2001 (per 100,000 
population), a decline of 32 percent.  Data on successful prosecution of marijuana cases for 
three states are given in Panel II of Table 4.3 (data for the other states/territories are not 
available).  For both NSW and SA, the prosecution rate has fallen substantially.  Not only has 
the prosecution rate fallen, lighter sentences have become much more common.  Interestingly, in  
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the early 1990s the prosecution rate was much higher in SA than in NSW, but by the end of the 
decade the rate was approximately the same in the two states.  In WA, the prosecution rate is 
fairly stable, but the period is much shorter.  No clear pattern emerges from the information on 
the percentage of arrests that result in a successful prosecution, as shown in Panel III of Table 
4.3. 
The evolution of enforcement of marijuana laws can be analysed in terms of a simple 
model that decomposes penalties into penalty type, regional and time effects (Clements, 2004).  
Controlling for regional and time effects, the estimated coefficient of the infringement dummy 
(which is the “penalty type” effect) indicates that these are significantly higher than arrests.  The 
estimated trend term shows that all penalties are falling on average by about 8 percent p.a., a fall 
that is significantly different from zero.  These results thus show that the “enforcement effort’ 
with respect to marijuana was indeed falling over time.  The model also allows for the 
identification of which regions are softer/tougher on marijuana.  As compared to NSW, 
Victoria, NT and ACT are all low-penalty regions, while the other four have higher penalties on 
average.  It is of considerable interest to compare this index of regional “legal attitudes” to 
marijuana to prices.  To do this, we use the results of row 4 of Table 4.1, which refers to prices 
of head ounce, the most popular product type, to rank regions in terms of the cost of marijuana, 
a ranking which is given in the first row of the table below: 
Cost (cheapest to 
most expensive) : 
NT WA SA TAS  QLD VIC  ACT  NSW
Penalties (weakest to 
 most severe) : 
ACT NT VIC  NSW TAS SA QLD  WA 
The estimates of the penalties model yield the ranking of regions given in the second row of the 
above.  As the relationship between the two rankings is obviously weak, with major differences 
for most states, regional disparities in penalties do not seem to be systematically associated with 
regional price differences.
11   
Taken as a whole, the above analysis seems to support the idea that participants in the 
marijuana industry have faced a declining probability of being arrested/successfully prosecuted; 
and even if they are arrested and successfully prosecuted, the expected penalty is now lower.  In 
other words, both the effort devoted to the enforcement of existing laws and penalties imposed 
seem to have decreased.  Accordingly, the expected value of this component of the “full cost” 
                                                 
11 Estimates for the penalties model also reveal that other factors remaining unchanged, more infringement notices 
are associated with fewer arrests, so the two types of penalties are substitutes for one another.  This, of course, must 
have been one of the key objectives associated with the introduction of the infringement regime.  
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of using marijuana has fallen.  During the period considered, NSW, Victoria, WA and Tasmania 
all introduced marijuana cautioning programs (ABCI, 2000) and SA, NT and ACT issued 
marijuana offence notices.  This seems to indicate changing community attitudes to marijuana 
associated with the reduced “policing effort”.  It is plausible that this has also led to lower 
marijuana prices.  As the riskiness of buying and selling marijuana has fallen, so may have any 
risk premium built into prices.  This explanation of lower prices has, however, been challenged 
by Basov et al. (2001) who analyse illicit drug prices in the United States.  They show that 
while drug prohibition enforcement costs have risen substantially over the past 25 years, the 
relative prices of drugs have nonetheless declined.  Basov et al. suggest four possible reasons 
for the decrease in prices:  (i) Production costs of drugs have declined; (ii) tax and regulatory 
cost increases have raised the prices of legal goods, but not illicit goods such as drugs; (iii) the 
market power of the illicit drug industry has fallen; and (iv) technologies to evade enforcement 
have improved.  Although hard evidence is necessarily difficult to obtain, Basov et al. argue 
against explanations (i) and (ii), and favour (iii) and (iv) as realistic possibilities.  We will have 
more to say about the possible impact of softening attitudes and laws on the workings of drugs 
markets in Section 8. 
We can summarise this material on marijuana prices as follows.  First, the relative price 
of marijuana has fallen substantially, by much more than those of many other commodities.  
Second, two possible explanations for this decline are (a) productivity improvement in the 
production of marijuana associated with the adoption of hydroponic growing techniques; and (b) 
the lower expected penalties for producing, buying and selling marijuana.  On the basis of the 
evidence currently available, both explanations seem to be equally plausible. 
 
5.  QUANTITY DISCOUNTS 
 
In addition to the above two patterns in marijuana prices, there is a third intriguing 
characteristic of prices, viz., the unit price of marijuana falls noticeably as the quantity 
purchased rises.  In the 1990s in Australia the average cost of an ounce of marijuana was about 
$450 and $35 for a gram.  As there are about 28 grams in an ounce, the cost of an ounce is 
equivalent to 450/28 = $16 per gram.   Accordingly, the unit cost drops from $35 to $16 if 
marijuana is purchased in the form of an ounce package, rather than a gram package.  Figure 5.1 
plots the unit prices of marijuana purchased in an ounce in the eight Australian states and 
territories over the decade of the 1990s against the corresponding gram prices.  As all points lie 
below the 
0 45 -degree line for both heads and leaf, it can be seen that unit ounce prices are less  
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than gram prices, and quantity discounts pertain.  Quantity discounts are quite common in many 
markets, and apply for instance to some grocery products, international air fares where prices 
for return trips can be substantially less than twice the one-way cost, and private school fees 
whereby a discount is given for the second and subsequent child from the same family.  In this 
section, we explore quantity discounts in the context of the economics of packaging and show 
that once these discounts are formulated appropriately, marijuana is priced in a manner not too 
dissimilar to that of a number of other products, both illicit and licit.
 12 
Theories of Quantity Discounts 
There are several explanations for quantity discounts, the first of which is price 
discrimination.  Here, lower unit prices for large purchases are interpreted as reflecting that 
large customers have a more elastic demand than smaller ones.  Of course, producers can only 
practise price discrimination when competition is lacking and when it is possible to limit resale 
of the product.  Such an explanation possibly applies to air fares where business travellers 
would tend to pay the high-cost fares, and tourists the cheaper fares. 
A second explanation for quantity discounts is that they reflect cost differences.  To 
illustrate, consider a stylised example, due to Telser (1978, Sec. 9.4), that focuses on the role of 
packaging costs in generating quantity discounts.  Suppose a certain grocery product of volume  
s, measured in terms of cubic cm say, is sold in a package in the form a cube, which has the 
linear dimension of  
13 s  , so that its surface area is  
23 6s ×
2 cm  .  If the packaging cost is α 
dollars per 
2 cm  and the product cost is β per 
3 cm  , then the total cost of the product, as a 
function of size  s, is   ( )




dl o g c 2
1
dl o g s 3
= γ+− γ , 
where  γ   is the share of packaging in total cost.  As this elasticity is clearly less than one, total 
cost rises less than proportionally with product size s, so that the unit cost cs declines as s 
rises.  This can be clearly seen from the unit cost function, which takes the form 
()
13 cs s 6 s − =α +β.  Another way of describing this result is that packaging is subject to 
economies of scale.
13  As packaging is a trivial part of the total costs of drugs, if we interpret 
                                                 
12 This section draws on Clements (forthcoming). 
13 It is to be noted that scale economies in package is a general result that does not hinge on the specific assumption 
that the package takes the form of a cube.  To illustrate, consider a sphere of radius  r , the surface area and volume  
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“packaging” in a narrow sense, this does not explain the observed quantity discounts for 
marijuana.  However, it may have some explanatory power if we think of packaging as referring 
to all the “value added” in going form larger to smaller drug packages. 
The role of risk in the drug business is another explanation of quantity discounts.  As 
each transaction involves the exposure to the probability of being busted, there are incentives to 
increase the average size of transactions and reduce their number as a risk-management strategy.  
This could lead to higher unit prices for smaller lot sizes as a reflection of a risk premium.
14  
Additionally, as holding an inventory of drugs is risky, quantity discounts for large transactions 
could also represent compensation for bearing this risk. 
The fourth approach to pricing and packaging is the model proposed by Caulkins and 
Padman (1993) that makes explicit the key structural parameters of the packaging industry in 
the relationship between price and package size.
15  As this model has been applied to illicit 
drugs, and as we shall refer back to it subsequently, it is appropriate to provide some details.  
Suppose there is a log-linear relationship between price of package size  s ,  () ps, and package 
size,  
(5.1)                                                           ( ) logp s logs = α+β , 
where  α  is an intercept and  β   is the size elasticity.  Thus 
(5.2)                                                               
β p(s)=as , 
where   ) ( exp a α = .  Suppose that initially an ounce of marijuana is purchased and that we 
measure size in terms of grams, so that  s=2 8  and  p(28)  is the price of this ounce.  If this 
ounce is then split into 28 gram packages, so that  s=1   now, the revenue from these 28 
packages is  28 × p(1),  where  p(1)  is the price of one gram.  Define the ratio of this revenue 
to the cost of an ounce as the markup factor,  δ = 28 × p(1) p(28),  or   
28 × p(1) = δ × p(28).  More generally, let   >1 φ   be the conversion factor that transforms the 
larger quantity  s  into a smaller one  s φ, so that in the previous example   =2 8 φ  .  Thus we 
have the following general relationship between prices of different package sizes, the markup 
and conversion factors: 
                                                                                                                                                            
of which are  ( )
23 A4 r , V 4 3r =π = π.  The area per unit of volume is 
13 AV 3r V
− == α , where α is a constant, 
so that unit packaging costs again decline with package size. 
14 When the penalties increase with volume, this argument for higher unit prices continues to hold as long as 
penalties increase proportionately less than volume. 
15 For a further elaboration and application of this model, see Caulkins (1997).  
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(5.3)                                                     ()







Our objective is to use equations (5.2) and (5.3) to derive an expression for the size 
elasticity  β   that involves the markup and conversion factors  δ  and  φ .  To do this, we use 
equation (5.2) in the form  
β φ = φ ) s ( a ) s ( p ,  so that the left-hand side of equation (5.3) 
becomes  
β φ φ ) s ( a .  Using equation (5.2) again, we can write the right-hand side of (5.3) as  
β δ s a .  Accordingly, equation (5.3) can be expressed as  ( )
β β s/ =δs φφ , or  
( ) 1-β = δ φ ,  which 
implies 







As the markup  0 δ>  and is presumably less than the conversion factor φ, the size elasticity β 
is a positive fraction.  Equation (5.4) also shows that the size elasticity falls with the markup  δ  
and rises with the conversion factor  φ.  If there is no markup,   1 δ =   and the size elasticity  
1 β= ,  so that price is just proportional to package size and there would be no quantity discount 
for buying in bulk.  When   1 δ> ,  the unit price falls with the quantity purchased, so that 
discounts would apply.  As the markup rises, so does the quantity discount and the 
(proportionate) increase in the total price resulting from a unit increase in package size is lower.  
In other words, the size elasticity  β  falls with the markup.  Other things equal, the greater the 
conversion factor  φ,  the more the product can be “split” or “cut” and the higher is the profit 
from the operation.  The role of the conversion factor in equation (5.4) is then to normalise by 
deflating the markup by the size of the conversion involved (e.g., in going from ounces to 
grams), thus making the size elasticity a pure number. 
To illustrate the workings of equation (5.4), suppose that the markup is 100 percent, so 
that  δ =2, and we convert from ounces to grams, in which case   =2 8 φ .  With these values, 
β = 1 - log2 log28 0.8 ≈ , so that a doubling of package size is associated with an 80 percent 
increase in price.  Equation (5.4) is an elegant result which yields considerable insights into the 
interactions between price and package size, and the role of the structural parameters  δ and  φ. 
The Discount Elasticity 
At the beginning of this section, we considered marijuana prices in Australia and 
compared the unit price of ounces, p(28) 28, with that that of grams, p(1), to conclude that  
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there was a substantial quantity discount.  To compare the price of a package of size  s  to that of 
a package of size one, define the unit-price ratio as  ( ) ( ) rp s s p 1 =⎡ ⎤ ⎣⎦ .
16  The logarithm of the 
ratio is 









For small values of the ratio r, dr 1 ≈− , which is the proportionate discount from bulk buying.  
Accordingly, we shall refer to  d  as the “logarithmic discount” or the “log discount” for short.  
The advantages of using  d  instead of  r1 −  are that it is symmetric in its base
17 and has 
desirable properties when averaged; additionally, the log discount is consistent with the log-
linear pricing equation (5.1), which is at the root of our subsequent analysis of quantity 
discounts.   
Figure 5.2 presents the logarithmic discount (5.5) for marijuana in Australia over the 
1990s.  As can be seen, on average, the log discount is about -0.8, which corresponds to about    
-55 percent.  While this is substantial, it has to be remembered that there is also a substantial 
quantity increase involved in purchasing an ounce of marijuana rather than a gram.  In this 
sense, the measure (5.5) is not really unit free, and thus cannot be compared across products for 
cases where the discounts involve different units.  One way to rectify the problem is to 
normalise (5.5) by the difference in the two package sizes, s and 1.  Accordingly, we define 

















where the second step follow from log1 0 = .  To interpret the measure d′, we return to equation 
(5.1) and subtract logs from both sides to obtain 
(5.7)                                                      ( ) ps
log logs
s
′ =α+β , 
                                                 
16 In the language of the Caulkins and Padman (1993) model considered above, r1 . = δ   Accordingly, a value of 
the unit-price ratio of r0 . 5 ≈ implies a markup of about 100 percent in the Australian marijuana industry. 













which means that if relative to a package of unit size, a package of size  s  sells at a discount of −α , then the unit 
package sells at a premium relative to  s  of α .  This is a property not shared by the proportionate discount r1 . −   
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where 1 ′ β= β −  is the size elasticity of the unit price, or the “discount elasticity” for short.  
Thus if there are quantity discounts, the size elasticity β in equation (5.1) is less than unity, the 
discount elasticity in (5.7) is negative and the unit price  ( ) ps s falls with  s .  Applying equation 
(5.7) to the unit package size yields  ( ) logp 1 , = α so that 












′ = β . 
This establishes that the unit-free measure d′ in equation (5.6) is interpreted as the discount 
elasticity  ′ β .  That d′ is this elasticity can also be seen from the second member of equation 
(5.6), which is the ratio of the logarithmic change in the unit price to that of the package size: 
()
()




s logs log1 log
1
⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
− ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ′ ==
− ⎡⎤
⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
   
Application to Marijuana and Other Products 
To get a feel for the value of the discount elasticity, we can use in numerator of the 
second member of equation (5.8) the mean of the log discount -0.8 and log28 3.33 ≈  in the 
denominator to yield   ˆ 0.8 3.33 0.25 ′ β≈− ≈ − .  In words, the discount elasticity is about minus 
one-quarter.
18  Equation (5.4) relates the size elasticity (β) to the markup factor (δ) and the 
conversion factor in going from a larger package size to a smaller one (φ).  That equation 
implies that the discount elasticity is related to these two factors according to   φ δ − = β′ log log .  
Thus,  0.25 ′ β=−   and   28 φ =   imply a markup factor of   ( ) exp 0.25 log28 2.30 δ= × = ,  or 
about 130 percent in transforming ounces into grams.  This value seems not unreasonable. 
It is remarkable that in broad terms at least, the above value of the discount elasticity of  
-0.25 is also obtained using other approaches with the marijuana data, as well as for other illicit 
drugs and groceries.  Full details of this strong claim are provided in Clements (forthcoming), 
but in what follows we give some illustrative evidence.  Equation (5.7) can be treated as a 
regression equation and the discount elasticity  ′ β  estimated as a coefficient.  Using the 
Australian marijuana data over time, products and/or over regions yields a number of estimates 
                                                 
18 This estimator of the discount elasticity is in fact exactly equivalent to the OLS estimator of  ′ β in equation (5.7).  
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of this elasticity, a summary of which appears in the form of a histogram in Figure 5.3.  As can 
be seen, the centre of gravity of these estimates is clearly very close to -0.25.  Next, we give in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 estimates of the discount elasticity for heroin and other illicit drugs, and on 
average at least the values are not too far from minus one-quarter.  Finally, Table 5.1 provides 
estimated elasticities for groceries and while there seems to be a bit more dispersion in this case, 
again we see the results are clustered around -0.25.
19  The absolute values of   ′ β   for baked 
beans and canned vegetables are somewhat higher than those for the other products, which may 
reflect larger markups and/or that packaging accounts for a larger share of total costs. 
Summary 
We thus conclude that quantity discounts, as measured by the discount elasticity  β′, 
seem to be more or less the same in both licit and illicit markets, at least to a first 
approximation.  In broad terms, the results support the following pricing rule:  The unit price 
falls by 2.5 percent when the product size increases by 10 percent.  While such a rule has much 
appeal in terms of its elegant simplicity, it is probably a bit of an exaggeration to claim that it 
has universal applicability and it would be premature to conclude that the discount elasticity has 
the status of a “natural constant”.
20 
 
                                                 
19 The grocery-price data are from Gordon Mills, who generously provided unpublished details from his survey of 
grocery prices; for details, see Mills (2002, Chap. 7). 
20 It is relevant to mention here the “rule of six-tenths” according to which the production function exhibits a 
specific type of economies of scale.  If Y is output produced with a piece of capital equipment of size K, then the 
production function is  
1/β Y=α K ′  , with  0.6 β≈  , so that the implied “factor demand equation” is  
β K=αY  .  For 
example, Whitesides (2005) recommends using this relationship to estimate the cost of equipment having capacity  
1 Y ,  on the basis of the known cost of equipment of smaller capacity   0 Y ,  according to   ()
0.6
10 1 0 KK Y Y = .  
Whitesides, who attributes the rule to Williams (1947), emphasises its use in the absence of more detailed 
information.  Indeed, he provides specific examples of equipment for which   0.6 β ≠ ,  such as an industrial boiler, 
where output is measured in terms of  lb hr , and  0.50 β = ; for a bucket conveyor belt (output in feet),   0.77 β = ;  
while for a stainless steel tank or vessel (gallons),   0.68 β = .  According to this rule, the unit cost function is  
1 KY Y
β− =α ,  so that the elasticity of unit cost with respect to size is  10 . 4 β−= −  when  0.6 β= .  Hence the unit 
cost falls with as capacity rises, so there are scale economies.  If it is thought that six-tenths is sufficiently close to 
three-quarters, then our results are not inconsistent with the rule.   
Consider again the expression derived at the start of this section for the elasticity of (total) cost  c  with 
respect to the package size s:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) logc logs 2 3 1 dd = γ+ − γ , where  γ  is the share  of packaging in total cost.  
This shows that the elasticity lies between two-thirds and unity, a range that excludes 0.6.  But this result depends 
on the simple stylised case in which the package takes the form of a cube.  Although the same result holds in the 
case of a sphere (see footnote 13), these simple examples should probably not be taken as serious evidence against 
the rule of six-tenths. 
We are indebted to Steven Schilizzi, University of Western Australia, and Jean-Baptiste Lesourd, 
Université de la Méditerranée, for drawing our attention to the rule of six-tenths and its possible relation to our 
work.  In personal communication, Lesourd refers to Arrow and Hahn (1971), Bruni (1965), Gazérian et al. (1991) 
and Park and Lesourd (2000) and describes the rule as “…not, in fact, anything like a ‘universal constant’ and, 
especially with multi-product firms, reality is quite more complex.  However, in certain specific areas of 
production, the rule remains a good approximation.”  
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6. THE PRICE-SENSITIVITY OF CONSUMPTION 
 
The previous two sections analysed marijuana prices to identify their patterns.     
We now combine prices and quantities to investigate their co-movement.  Such an investigation 
is required to answer questions such as, by how much would its usage change if marijuana were 
legalised?  Could substantial government revenue be raised by taxing marijuana usage?  How 
does its consumption interact with that of alcohol?  These issues all involve the price-sensitivity 
of consumption.  In this section, we present some evidence on the extent to which marijuana 
consumption is responsive to variations in its price.  As alcohol and marijuana share some 
important common characteristics, we shall analyse their consumption jointly.  We start with a 
discussion of marijuana consumption data and present a comparison with drinking patterns.  
This section also contains material on indexes of prices and consumption of marijuana and 
alcohol, and demand equations.
21 
Prices and Quantities 
The marijuana consumption data are estimated by Clements and Daryal (2005a) on the 
basis of (i) the frequency of consumption information available in the National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey (various issues) and (ii) reasonable assumptions about the intensity of 
consumption.  Although all care has been taken with the preparation of these estimates, by their 
very nature they are subject to more than the usual degree of uncertainties.  Nonetheless, there is 
no reason to expect the estimates to be biased one way or another and, in broad outline, they 
agree with other studies such as Marks (1992).
22 The consumption and prices of the three 
alcoholic beverages and marijuana are presented in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 plots the 
consumption data.  As can be seen, per capita consumption of beer decreases noticeably over 
this period, from more than 140 litres in 1988 to 117 in 1998.  Wine consumption also decreases 
-- by almost 1.2 litres to end up at 24.6 litres in 1998.  But in contrast to beer, wine consumption 
increases in each of the last three years.  The time path of spirits is roughly similar to that of 
wine -- it first declines substantially, bottoms out in the early 1990s and then more than recovers 
to end up at 4.3 litres in 1998.  Marijuana consumption starts off at 0.65 ounces in 1988, 
increases steadily until it reaches a peak of 0.83 oz in 1991, tends to decrease for the next 
several years and then increases again to end up at 0.79 oz in 1998.  It can be shown that this 
variability in marijuana consumption is mostly due to the weekly and monthly consumers.  Note 
                                                 
21 This section is based on Clements and Daryal (2005a). 
22 See Clements and Daryal (2005a) for details.  Note, however, these estimates of consumption have been 
challenged by Jiggens (in progress).  
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from the last column of the bottom panel of Table 6.1 that the nominal price of marijuana is 
taken to be constant over this period.  When this research was originally carried out, we had no 
detailed information on the evolution of prices over time.  As the assumption of constant prices 
is contradicted by the evidence presented in Section 4, the results reported in this section have 
only a preliminary status. 
Table 6.2 combines the quantity and price data and presents expenditures on, and budget 
shares of, the four goods.  The budget share is expenditure on the good in question expressed as 
a fraction of total expenditure on the four goods.  Several interesting features emerge from this 
table: (i) Marijuana absorbs about 30 percent of expenditure on the four goods.  (ii) Expenditure 
on marijuana is almost equal to that on wine plus spirits; and it is about three-quarters of beer 
expenditure.  (iii) Over the 11 years, the budget share of spirits rises by almost 4 percentage 
points, while that of beer falls by 3+ percentage points.  Table 6.3 gives the quantity and price 
data in terms of log-changes.  The upper panel of the table shows that, on average, beer 
consumption decreases by about 1.9 percent p.a., wine decreases by 0.5 percent, spirits increases 
by 0.8 percent and marijuana increases by 2.0 percent.  The growth in consumption of both 
spirits and marijuana exhibit considerable volatility.  For example, while spirits consumption 
grows at a mean rate of 0.8 percent p.a., in 1993 consumption of this beverage increases by 
more than 10 percent; and in the same year, marijuana declines by more than 8 percent, while its 
average growth rate is 2.0 percent.   
Index Numbers 
As an informal way to study the price-sensitivity of consumption, and as a way of 
summarising the data, we begin by presenting price and volume indexes.  Let  it p  be the price of 
good  i  in year  t  and  it q  be the corresponding quantity consumed per capita.  Then, if there are  
n  goods,  ∑ = =
n
1 i it it t q p M  is total expenditure and  t it it it M q p w =  is the budget share of i.  Let 
() 1 t , i it it w w
2
1
w − + =  be the arithmetic average of the budget share over the years  1 t −  and t; 
and  1 t , i it it p log p log Dp − − =  and  1 t , i it it q log q log Dq − − =  be the  i
th  price and quantity log-
changes.  The Divisia price and volume indexes are then defined as 










it it t Dq w DQ . 
The Divisia price index is a budget-share-weighted average of the  n  price log-changes and thus 
represents a centre-of-gravity measure of the prices.  This index also has a statistical  
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interpretation (Theil, 1967, p. 136): Suppose we draw prices at random such that each dollar of 
expenditure has an equal chance of being selected.  Then, the budget share  it w  is the probability 
of drawing  it Dp  for the transition from year  1 t −  to t, so that the expected value of the prices is 
∑ =
n
1 i it itDp w , the Divisia index.  The Divisia volume index has a similar interpretation and 
measures the overall growth in per capita consumption. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6.4 contain  t DP  and  t DQ  for the three alcoholic beverages 
plus marijuana (so that  4 n = ).  As can be seen, on average the price index rises by about 2.6 
percent p.a., while the volume index falls by 0.1 percent p.a.  The indexes defined in equation 
(6.1) represent weighted first-order moments of the  n  prices  nt t 1 Dp ,..., Dp  and the  n  quantities 
nt t 1 Dq ,..., Dq .  The corresponding second-order moments are the Divisia variances: 




t it it t DP Dp w ∑
=




t it it t DQ Dq w ∑
=
− = Κ . 
These variances measure the dispersion across commodities of the prices and quantities.   
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 6.4 give (6.2) for  4 n = .  These show that for a given year there is 
usually more dispersion in quantities than prices.  The final second-order moment is the Divisia 
price-quantity covariance, defined as  () ( )
n
ti t i t t i t t i1 wD p D PD q D Q
= Γ= − − ∑ .  Given the 
tendency of consumers to move away from those goods whose prices increase faster than 
average, we expect  t Γ  to be negative.  This covariance is given in column 6 of Table 6.4 and, as 
can be seen, in 7 out of 10 cases it is negative.  Column 7 gives the corresponding correlation, 
tt t ΓΠ Κ , the mean value of which is -0.2.   
As  it Dp  is the change in the nominal price of the i
th good and  t DP  is an index of the 
change in the prices of all goods (namely, alcoholic beverages and marijuana),  t it DP Dp −  is 
interpreted as the change in the relative price of  i.  Similarly, as  t it DQ Dq −  is the change in 
the quantity consumed of  i  relative to the average, this can also be termed the change in the 
relative quantity of  i.  The means ( 100 × ) of these relative price and quantity changes are: 
 Quantities     Prices 
Beer -1.8   1.0  
Wine -0.4   0.9  
Spirits 0.9   1.8  
Marijuana 2.1   -2.6   
 
35
As in three out of the four cases the quantity change has the opposite sign to the price change, 
we see again that there is a tendency for consumption of those goods whose relative price rises 
to grow slower than average, and vice versa. 
Consider the following way of measuring the degree of interrelationship between the 
consumption of the four goods.  Suppose that total consumption of the four goods is held 
constant, and that for some reason or another (such as a heat wave) beer is subject to a random 
shock causing its consumption to increase.  If at the same time marijuana consumption falls, 
then, as more of one good compensates for less of the other, it would seem that both goods are 
capable of satisfying the same type of want of the consumer.  In such a case, as these goods are 
competitive, it would be natural to describe beer and marijuana as being substitutes for one 
another.  By a similar argument, goods whose consumption is positively correlated reinforce 
each other and can be described as complements.
23  We implement this idea by computing the 
correlation coefficients between the relative quantity change in good  i,  t it DQ Dq − , and that of 
good  j,  t jt DQ Dq −  for all pairs i, j 1,...,4 = ; deflating the individual quantity changes by  t DQ  
serves to hold constant total consumption of the group of goods.  The results, presented in Table 
6.5, indicate that the three alcoholic beverages are all negatively correlated with marijuana and 
are thus substitutes.  Interestingly, for each of the three rows referring to alcoholic beverages, 
the largest (in absolute value) off-diagonal correlation always involves marijuana; these 
correlations are beer-marijuana -0.7, wine-marijuana -0.7 and spirits-marijuana -0.9.   
Accordingly, there seems to be some strength in the substitutability relationship between alcohol 
and marijuana.  Note also that the three within-alcohol correlations are all positive, indicating 
complementarity.  While this sort of behaviour cannot be ruled out, as these correlations are all 
lower than the others, less weight should be given to this finding. 
Demand Equations 
In this sub-section we proceed more formally and present estimates for own- and cross-
price elasticities for the three alcoholic beverages and marijuana which are derived from a 
demand system.  Due to the limited number of observations available, as well as the lack of 
variability of the price of marijuana, this requires substantial structuring of the problem in the 
form of several simplifying assumptions.  Because of its straightforward nature and because it is 
widely used, the demand system we use is the Rotterdam model due to Barten (1964) and Theil 
(1965).   
                                                 
23  This approach to substitutability/complementarity based on residual correlations has a long history, going back 




To keep things manageable, we take alcohol and marijuana to be a separable block in the 
consumer’s utility function, so that we can consider the group by itself, and suppose that within 
the group each of the goods is preference independent in the sense that the marginal utility of 
consumption is independent of the consumption of the other goods.
24  Under these conditions, 
the i
th equation of the Rotterdam model takes the form 
(6.3)                                    ( ) it t it i t i it it P D Dp DQ Dq w ε + ′ − θ φ + θ = , 
where  M ) q p ( i i i ∂ ∂ = θ  is the marginal share of good  i; φ is the own-price elasticity of 
demand for the group of goods as a whole;  ∑ = θ = ′
n
1 i it i t Dp P D  is the Frisch price index; and   it ε  
is a disturbance term.  By dividing both sides of equation (6.3) by  it w , it can be seen that 
iiit w η= θ   is the i
th income elasticity, and   ii i it w ′ η =φ θ   is the elasticity of demand for  i  
with respect to its relative price,  it Dp DP′ − , also known as the Frisch price elasticity.  For 
i, j 1,...,n, =  the compensated (or Slutsky) price elasticities, which hold real total expenditure on 
the group constant, take the form   ( ) ij ii ij j jt w ′ η= η δ− η , where  ij δ  is the Kronecker delta 
() ij 1 if i= j, 0 otherwise δ= ; and the corresponding uncompensated (or Marshallian) elasticities 
are  ij ij i jt w
∗ η= η− η .
25  To further simplify the problem of estimating equation (6.3) for i=1,…,4, 
the values of the marginal shares are specified in advance on the basis of prior studies,
26 so that 
φ is the only unknown parameter.  Using the Australian data, the GLS estimate of this 
parameter is -0.429, with standard error 0.227.
27  This is the estimated price elasticity of demand 
for alcohol and marijuana as a whole; the value of this elasticity is reasonable and it is 
significantly different from zero.   
The top part of Table 6.6 gives the implied matrix of compensated price elasticities.  The 
own-price elasticity of beer is -0.2, wine -0.4, spirits -0.6 and marijuana -0.3.  Interestingly, for 
                                                 
24 For details, see, e. g., Theil (1980) and Clements (1987a, 1987b).  The assumption of preference independence 
will be discussed in the next section. 
25 As
nn
it i i1 i1 w1
== =θ = ∑∑and  ii i t w, η= θ  it follows that 
n
ij j1 0
= η = ∑  and 
n
j1 i j i, i=1,...,n,
∗
= η= − η ∑  which reflect 
demand homogeneity. 
26 The income elasticities are taken to be 0.5 for beer, 1.0 for wine, 2.0 for spirits and 1.2 for marijuana.  When the 
four budget shares are specified as 0.4, 0.15, 0.15 and 0.3, the implied marginal shares are 0.20, 0.15, 0.30 and 0.35 
(in the same order as before).  See Clements and Daryal (2005a) for details. 
27 The disturbances  it ε  are assumed to have zero means and to economise on unknown parameters, have variances 
and covariances of the form
2
ii j j w( w) σδ − , where 
2 σ  is a constant; and  i w  is the sample mean of  it w .  This 





each alcoholic beverage, the largest cross-price elasticity is for the price of marijuana:  The 
elasticity of beer consumption with respect to the price of marijuana is 0.1; wine-marijuana is 
0.2; and spirits-marijuana is 0.3.  The corresponding uncompensated elasticities are given in the 
bottom panel of Table 6.6.  The own-price elasticities are now -0.4, -0.5, -0.9 and -0.7 for beer, 
wine, spirits and marijuana, respectively.  An element-by-element comparison of the 
uncompensated elasticities with their compensated counterparts reveals two major differences: 
(i) When the income effects are included, due to the high budget share of beer of about 40 
percent, the elasticities involving the price of beer (given in column 2) are all (algebraically) 
much lower than when these effects are excluded.  (ii) The four uncompensated elasticities of 
spirits (given in the row for that good) are all much smaller algebraically than their compensated 
counterparts due to the high income elasticity of spirits of 2 (see footnote 26).  In comparison 
with previous studies, the values of the own-price elasticities for the three alcoholic beverages 
are reasonable (for a recent survey, see Fogarty, 2005, Chap. 2).  There are only two prior 
comparable studies of the own-price elasticity of demand for marijuana.  First, Nisbet and Vakil 
(1972), using US data, find it to lie in the range -0.5 to -1.5, so that our estimate of the 
uncompensated elasticity lies within this range.  Second, Daryal (2002) employs survey data to 
estimate the elasticity to be -0.4 for frequent users, -0.1 for occasional users and 0 for those who 
are not currently users.  Given that the bulk of marijuana is consumed by frequent users, our 
estimates are not greatly at variance with his. 
 
7. A USEFUL RULE OF THUMB: PRICE ELASTICITIES ARE ABOUT -1/2 
 
The own-price price elasticities for alcohol and marijuana discussed in the previous 
section are clustered around the value of minus one half.  As this center-of-gravity value applies 
in a number of other instances also, we shall consider in this section what theoretical 
justification lies behind the empirical regularity of price elasticities being approximately equal 
to minus one half.  We commence the discussion by considering several examples. 
Table 7.1 and Figure 7.1 present information from reviews regarding estimated price 
elasticities for a number of different commodities.  Panels 1-3 of the table show that the major 
alcoholic beverages have mean/median elasticities not too away from the value -½.  The means 
from Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005a) are beer –0.37 (with standard error 0.09), wine –0.46 
(0.08) and spirits –0.57 (0.12), so that the maximum distance from -½ is a mere 1.4 standard 
errors.  The next two panels of the table, Panels 4 and 5, show that more or less the same result 
holds for cigarettes and residential water.  For petrol (Panel 6), the long-run elasticities tend to  
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be closer to -½  than the short-run values.  A possible exception to the “rule of -½” is 
residential electricity (Panel 7), which has a mean short-run elasticity of demand of –0.35, while 
the mean long-run value is –0.85.  Finally, Panel 8 of the table shows that the mean price 
elasticity of “branded products” is –1.76, which is substantially different from -½.  But this is 
not unexpected as there are many good substitutes for a branded product -- other brands of the 
same basic product.  In this sense then, branded products are fundamentally different to the 
others in the table:  Branded products are much more narrowly defined than are products such as 
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, water, petrol and electricity.  In what follows, we develop a 
theory that is applicable to broader products only, not more narrowly defined goods like branded 
products. 
We shall present the theory in the context of the Rotterdam model but as the arguments 
that follow are more general, this is only for purposes of convenience.
28  We thus return to 
demand equation (6.3), which we reproduce here with the disturbance term set at its expected 
value of zero: 
(7.1)                                        ( ) it it i t i it t wD q D Q D p D P ′ =θ +φ θ − . 
This is the 
th i demand equation of the Rotterdam model under the assumption of preference 
independence.  Initially, suppose we apply this model to an exhaustive set of  n  goods, rather 
than just a sub-set; we could then describe this as an unconditional application, whereas the sub-
set case would be a conditional one.  In equation (7.1),  it w  is the budget share of good  i  
averaged over the two years t-1, t;  the  n  budget shares have a unit sum, that is 
n
it i1 w1
= = ∑ .  
The term  it Dq  is the log-change from t-1  to  t  in the quantity consumed of  i , 
it it i,t 1 Dq logq logq − =− , and it can be shown that the left-hand variable of equation (7.1), 
it it wD q , is the quantity component of the change in the budget share of  i.  The first term on the 
right of (7.1) is   it DQ θ , which refers to the effect of a change in real income on the demand for  
i.  In this term,  i θ  is the 
th i marginal share, which answers the question, if income increases by 
one dollar, what fraction of this increase is spent on  i , with 
n
i i1 1
= θ = ∑  as it is assumed that the 
increase is spent on something.  The change in real income is measured by the Divisia volume 
index 
n
ti t i t i1 DQ w Dq = =∑ , which shows that the variable on the left-hand side of equation (7.1) 
                                                 
28 Underlying the Rotterdam model is Theil’s (1980) differential approach to consumption theory, which will be 
discussed in Section 9.  
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is also interpreted as the contribution of good  i  to this index.  Thus the income term of equation 
(7.1) is a fraction  i θ  of the Divisia volume index. 
The second term on the right of (7.1),  ( ) ii t t Dp DP′ φθ − , deals with the impact of changes 
in the relative price of good  i.  The coefficient φ is the income flexibility (the reciprocal of the 
income elasticity of the marginal utility of income);  i θ  is the same marginal share of  i; 
it it i,t 1 Dp logp logp − =−  is the log-change in the 
th i price; and  ∑ = θ = ′
n
1 i it i t Dp P D  is the Frisch 
price index which uses marginal shares as weights, which has the effect of holding constant the 
marginal utility of income.  Accordingly, in this relative price term the change in the nominal 
price of good  i,   it Dp , is deflated by the Frisch index of the change in all  n  prices.  It is to be 
noted that the right-hand side of equation (7.1) contains only the change in the own-relative 
price, not the others.  This is an implication of the assumption of preference independence, 
whereby tastes can be characterised by a utility function that is additive in the  n  goods, 
() ( )
n
1n i i i1 u q ,...,q u q = =∑ , with  () ii uq the 
th i  sub-utility function that depends only on the 
consumption of good  i.  Preference independence (PI) implies that each marginal utility 
depends only on the consumption of the good in question, not the others, so that all second-
order cross derivatives of the utility function vanish.   
The assumption of  PI  means that as commodities do not interact in the utility function, 
utility is derived from the consumption of good 1 and good 2 and good 3, and so on, where the 
word “and” is underlined to emphasise the additive nature of preferences.  Such a hypothesis 
about tastes is more applicable to broader aggregates than more finely distinguished goods such 
as “branded products”.  Another way of making the same argument is via the demand equations 
under PI, which for good  i  takes the form of equation (7.1).  As only the own-relative price 
appears in this equation, the substitution possibilities are clearly restricted by the assumption of 
PI.  Thus as the broader aggregates have few substitutes, it can again be seen that these types of 
goods are more suitable for the application of the assumption of PI. 
To understand further the workings of equation (7.1), we divide both sides by  it wt o  
yield  
( ) it i t ii it t Dq DQ Dp DP ′ ′ =η +η − , 
where  ii i t w η= θ is the i
th income elasticity and  ii i it w ′ η =φ θ  is the elasticity of demand for 
good i  with respect to its relative price.  As this relative price uses the Frisch index as the 




Frisch own-price elasticity.  It can be seen that these price elasticities are proportional to the 
corresponding income elasticities, with factor of proportionality  φ.  That is,   
(7.2)                                                    ii i, ′ η= φ η        i=1,...,n. 
Accordingly, luxuries (goods with  i 1) η > are more price elastic than necessities ( i 1) η < .  
Deaton (1974) refers to a variant of this proportionality relationship as “Pigou’s (1910) law”.  
The proportionality relationship (7.2) agrees with the intuitive idea that necessities (luxuries) 
tend to be essential (discretionary) goods, which have few (many) substitutes. 
The budget constraint implies that a budget-share weighted average of the income 
elasticities is unity, that is, 
n
i1 it i w1 , = ∑ η = so that an “average” commodity has an income 
elasticity of unity.  This means that for such a commodity, the Frisch price elasticity   ii ′ η =φ.  
An alternative way to establish the same result is to consider an average commodity in the 
Frisch elasticity space; the price elasticity of this good is given by a budget-share weighted 
average of the  n  Frisch elasticities, 
n
it ii i1 w
= ′ η ∑ .  If we multiply both sides of the proportionality 
relationship (7.2) by  it w , sum over i 1,...,n = , and use 
n
i i it i i=1 wa n d  1 η =θ θ = ∑ , we then 
obtain 
n
it ii i1 w
= ′ η= φ ∑ .  This reveals that the average Frisch elasticity is also equal to φ.  A 
substantial body of research points to the value of the income flexibility φ being approximately 
minus one half.
29  This means for an average commodity, the Frisch price elasticity will also 
                                                 
29 Selvanathan (1993) uses time-series data to estimate a differential demand system for each of 15 OECD 
countries.  For Australia, the φ -estimate is  –0.46, with asymptotic standard error  0.08  (Selvanathan, 1993,          
p. 189).  When the data are pooled over the 15 countries, the estimate of φ  is  –0.45, with ASE 0.02 (Selvanathan, 
1993, p. 198).  Using a related approach, Selvanathan (1993, Sec. 6.4) obtains 322 estimates of φ , one for each 
year in the sample period for each of 18 OECD countries; the weighted mean of these estimates is very similar to 
those above at  –0.46 (ASE = 0.03).  Two other cross-country estimates of φ  are also relevant:  Using the ICP data 
for 30 countries from Kravis et al. (1982), Theil (1987a, Sec. 2.8) obtains a φ -estimate of –0.53 (0.04).  Chen 
(1999, p. 171) estimates a demand system for 42 countries and obtains an estimate of φ  of –0.42 (0.05), when there 
are intercepts in his differential demand equations, which play the role of residual trends in consumption, and –0.29 
(0.05) when there are no such intercepts.  The final element of support for  0.5 φ =−  is the earlier, but still 
influential, survey by Brown and Deaton (1972, p. 1206) who review previous findings and conclude that “there 
would seem to be fair agreement on the use of a value for φ  around minus one half”.   
It should be noted that treating the income flexibility as a constant parameter is at variance with Frisch’s 
(1959) famous conjecture that φ should increase in absolute value as the consumer becomes more affluent. 
However, most tests of the Frisch conjecture tend to reject it; see, e.g., Clements and Theil (1996), Selvanathan 
(1993, Secs. 4.8 and 6.5), Theil (1975/76, Sec. 15.4), Theil (1987a, Sec. 2.13) and Theil and Brooks (1970/71). 
Such a finding is not surprising as the Frisch conjecture refers to the third-order derivative of the utility function, 
and most consumption data could not be expected to be very informative about the nature of this higher-order 
effect.  On the other hand however, evidence supporting Frisch has been reported by DeJanvry et al. (1972) and 
Lluch et al. (1977).  Note also that according to Frisch (1959, p. 189) a φ -value of –0.5 would pertain to the 
“middle income bracket, ‘the median part’ of the population”.  
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take the value of minus one half.  As not all goods will coincide with the “average” exactly, we 
have to modify the above statement to the weaker form that the  n  Frisch price elasticities will 
be approximately equal to minus one half.
30  As the more common Slutsky (or compensated) 
own-price elasticity is equal to its Frisch counterpart minus a term of order 1n, in most cases 
the differences will be small, so the Slutsky elasticities will also be scattered around -½.
31 
The above discussion relates to the unconditional case with preference independence.  If 
the assumption of preference independence is given up, the demand equation for good  i   
becomes more complex with the substitution term on the right-hand side of (7.1), 
() ii t t Dp DP′ φθ − , replaced by a term involving own- and cross-relative prices, viz., 
()
n
ij it t i1 Dp DP
= ′ ν− ∑ , where  ij ν  is a new price coefficient.  The demand equation thus becomes 
(7.3)                                             ()
n
it it i t ij it t
i1
wD q D Q D p D P
=
′ =θ + ν − ∑ . 
The price coefficient in this equation  ij ν  is defined as 
ij
ij (p p / M ) u λ , where  0 λ>  is the 
marginal utility of income,  i p  is the price of good  i, M is nominal income and  u
ij  is the  (i, j)
th  
element of the inverse of the Hessian matrix of the utility function.  If  ij 0 (<0) ν> , then an 
increase in the relative price of good  j  causes consumption of  i  to increase (decrease), and the 
two goods are said to be Frisch substitutes (complements).  These price coefficients satisfy 
n
ij i j1 = ν= φ θ ∑ . As  ij ij it w ′ η= ν is the 
th  (i, j) Frisch price elasticity (marginal utility of income 
constant), the constraint of the previous sentence implies that   ii • ′ η =φ η , where  
n
ii j j1 • = ′′ η= η ∑  is 
                                                 
30 In a widely cited paper, Deaton (1974) examines whether price and income elasticities are (approximately) 
proportional, as predicted by preference independence.  On the basis of UK data, he finds no such relationship and 
concludes that “the assumption of additive preferences [preference independence] is almost certain to be invalid in 
practice and the use of demand models based on such an assumption will lead to severe distortion of measurement” 
(his emphasis).  Deaton’s rejection of preference independence (PI) on the basis of indirect evidence (the lack of 
proportionality of price and income elasticities) is consistent with first-generation direct tests that test the implied 
parametric restrictions on the demand equations; see Barten (1977) for a survey.  These results can be responded to 
in two ways.  First, Selvanathan (1993) examines elasticities from 18 OECD countries, and finds the evidence not 
inconsistent with the proportionality relationship, indicating that Deaton may have been premature in declaring the 
invalidity of PI.  Second, as the first-generation tests of the hypothesis of PI have only an asymptotic justification, it 
is appropriate to exercise caution in taking the results at face value when the underlying sample sizes are not large.  
To avoid potential problems with asymptotics associated with modest sample sizes, Selvanathan (1987, 1993) 
develops a Monte Carlo test of PI, and the results reject the hypothesis much less frequently.  For example, in 
applications of the methodology, Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005b) reject PI in 9 countries out of a total of 45; 
Clements et al. (1997) are unable to reject PI for beer, wine and spirits in all of the 7 countries they consider; and 
Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005a, p. 235) are unable to reject the hypothesis for the three alcoholic beverages in 
10 countries.  While there is still scope for differing views on this matter, it now seems safe to conclude that the 
assumption of PI should not be rejected out of hand, or at least as rapidly as the older studies would imply.  
31 The relationship between the Slutsky  ii () η  and Frisch own-price elasticities is   ii ii i (1 ) ′ η =η −θ .  As 
n
i i1 1
= θ = ∑ , the 
order of the marginal shares is 1n, as is the difference between   ii η  and  ii ′ η .  
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the sum of the own- and cross-price elasticities involving good  i  and  i η  is the 
th i income 
elasticity.  Thus whereas PI implies that the Frisch own-price elasticities are proportional to the 
corresponding income elasticities, when we give up the assumption of PI the sums of own- and 
cross-price Frisch elasticities are proportional to income elasticities.  Application of the 
argument in the previous paragraph then shows that these sums are approximately equal to -
½.
32   
Now consider the conditional case, when we analyse the demand for a group of goods, 
rather than all goods simultaneously.  An example of such a group is “vice” comprising beer, 
wine, spirits and marijuana, which was analysed in the previous section.  Here φ is now 
interpreted as the own-price elasticity of demand for vice as a whole.  But this version of φ is 
exactly equal to  ii ′ η , the own-price Frisch elasticity that is implied by the unconditional equation 
when vice is taken to be the 
th i  good among the original  n, when preference independence 
holds.  This means that in conditional applications φ continues be to approximately equal to 
minus one half.  Thus under preference independence, conditional own-price elasticities are 
approximately minus one half.  When preference independence does not hold, the sums of 
conditional own-and cross-price elasticities fluctuate around -½. 
This section can be summarised as follows: 
•  The price elasticities for beer, wine, spirits and marijuana that were discussed in 
the previous section are clustered around the value of -½.  This can be 
understood in terms of the underlying assumption of preference independence. 
•  Other studies that are not based on preference independence also point to a 
centre-of-gravity of about -½ for the price elasticities. 
•  Recent econometric testing tends to find more support for the hypothesis of 
preference independence, although the matter has probably still not been 
completely settled. 
•  When nothing else is known about the price-sensitivity of a good, a reasonable 
value of its price elasticity is minus one half.
33    
 
 
                                                 
32 Under PI, the Hessian matrix of the utility function is diagonal, so that 
ij u0 = for i j ≠ .  This means that  ij 0 ν =  
for ij ≠ , so that constraint  
n
j1 ij i = ν= φθ ∑  implies  ii i ν = φθ , and equation (7.3) reduces to (7.1).    
33 For a more detailed presentation of the material of this section, see Clements (2005).  
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8.  WHAT IF MARIJUANA WERE LEGALISED? 
 
Thus far we have analysed the evolution of prices and the effects of prices on the 
consumption of marijuana and alcoholic leverages.  That material deals with enhancing 
understanding of the way the market for marijuana works, or, perhaps, how the market has 
operated in the past.  We now change the focus substantially to discuss what may happen to the 
operation of  this market in light of a hypothetical major policy change, the legalisation of 
marijuana.  This involves an examination of possible changes to prices, consumption and 
government revenues from taxation.  In a certain sense, however, the investigation that follows 
still has the objective of trying to understand the way the world works, with the word “works” 
interpreted to now refer to how it might work in the future in a legalised, or more deregulated, 
environment.  This section begins with an analysis of the likely effects of legalisation on prices, 
and then turns to the effects on the consumption of marijuana and alcohol.  In the next section, 
we extend the analysis by considering the implications of legalisation for government revenue 
from taxing vice consumption. 
Would Prices Decrease or Increase? 
Following Miron (2005), we can analyse the impact on prices of legalisation by 
reference to the relative shifts of the marijuana demand and supply curves.  For simplicity of 
exposition, we shall discuss this in terms of complete legalisation, but it should be understood 
that in qualitative terms, the same analysis applies to the less-than-complete legalisation case.  
According to the “forbidden fruit” hypothesis, legalisation makes marijuana less attractive and 
shifts the demand curve down and to the left, as in Panel A of Figure 8.1.  On the other hand, as 
emphasised by Niskanen (1992), legalisation would reduce search costs and the risk of 
prosecution, and possibly also improve product quality.  These effects would cause the demand 
curve to shift up and to the right.  Evidence on how the demand curve shifts based on the 
experience with decriminalisation, which could be thought of as a weak form of legalisation, in 
(predominantly) the states of the US is mixed:  Studies using data pertaining to the whole 
population (Cameron and Williams, 2001, Model, 1993, Saffer and Chaloupka, 1995, 1998) find 
a significant increase in marijuana consumption due to decriminalisation.
34  By contrast, three 
other studies involving youths only (Johnston et al., 1981, Pacula, 1998, Theis and Register, 
1993) find that decriminalisation has no significant impact.  Evidently, as the general population 
consume less marijuana than do the young, their consumption is more sensitive to changes in its 
                                                 
34 It is to be noted, however, Cameron and Williams (2001) find the increase in consumption to be only temporary.  
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legal status.  On the basis of a survey of university students, Daryal (2002) finds that on average 
consumption would increase modestly with legalisation.  We will have more to say about 
Daryal’s results in the next sub-section. 
Regarding the supply curve, Miron (1998, 2005) argues on a priori grounds that 
legalisation could shift it either up or down, as shown in Panel B of Figure 8.1.  With 
legalisation, producers would no longer be forced to incur costs associated with concealing their 
activities to avoid prosecution, causing the supply curve to shift down and to the right.  On the 
other hand however, legalisation would also mean that producers become part of the legitimate 
sector of the economy and would have to pay taxes and charges, and comply with all regulations 
that conventional businesses are subject to.  Additionally, marijuana producers would possibly 
have to incur advertising expenses if the product were legalised.  These effects would cause the 
supply curve to shift up and to the left. 
The net effect of these shifts in the demand and supply curves on prices is ambiguous as 
is illustrated in Panel C of Figure 8.1 for the simplified case in which the demand curve remains 
unchanged.  This ambiguity can only be resolved with empirical evidence.  While such evidence 
is not easy to obtain, Miron (2005) argues that on the basis of a comparison of marijuana prices 
in the US, where restrictions are stronger, and Australian and The Netherlands, where they are 
weaker, the net effect on prices likely to be quite small.  Another piece of evidence that points in 
the same direction is Miron’s (2003) finding on the basis of an extremely detailed and careful 
analysis, that markups from “farmgate” to consumers of heroin and cocaine are substantially 
smaller than previously thought.  He finds while these markups are high, they are not massively 
larger than those of legal goods such as chocolate, coffee, tea and barley/beer.  On the basis of 
other evidence, Miron (2003, p. 529) estimates “that the black market price of cocaine is 2-4 
times the price that would obtain in a legal market, and of heroin 6-19 times.  In contrast, prior 
research has suggested that cocaine sells at 10 to 40 times its legal price and heroin at hundreds 
of times its legal price.”  While there are other factors determining markups, the smaller-than-
previously-thought markups could be taken to imply that the illicit nature of these drugs per se 
has only a limited (or a more limited that previously thought) impact on prices.  Under this 
interpretation, the price effects of legalisation would likewise be limited.
35  Consistent with this 
line of thinking is research showing that increased enforcement of drug laws does not seem to 
                                                 
35  Miron (1999) provides some further evidence with his study of the impact of prohibition on alcohol consumption 
in the United States during 1920-33.  Using the death rate from liver cirrhosis as a proxy for alcohol consumption, 
he finds that prohibition “exerted a modest and possibly even positive effect on consumption.”  This could be 
because prices fell for reasons given above.  But there are other possibilities including a highly inelastic demand for 
alcohol and/or prohibition giving alcohol the status of a “forbidden fruit” (Miron, 1999).  
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result in higher prices (Basov et al, 2001, DiNardo, 1993, Weatherburn and Lind, 1997, Yuan 
and Caulkins, 1998). 
The UWA Survey 
As discussed above, on a priori grounds it is not clear which way the demand curve 
could shift with legalisation.  One approach to resolving this issue is to carry out as survey of 
consumers, as in Daryal (2002) who surveys 327 first-year economics students at the University 
of Western Australia.  His results, for various types of consumers identified by sex and the 
intensity of their use of marijuana, are summarised in Table 8.1.  The key results are that (i) the 
consumption of daily users is estimated to increase substantially (although it should be kept in 
mind that the corresponding standard error is relatively large); (ii) that of weekly, monthly and 
occasional users is estimated to increase much less, by 7-9 percent; (iii) for all individuals, 
legalisation is estimated to increase consumption by about 4 percent on average; (iv) legalisation 
has essentially no effect on encouraging non-users to take up marijuana consumption; and (v) on 
average, the consumption of males increases by more than that of females following 
legalisation. 
As discussed above, since marijuana and alcohol have not dissimilar effects on users, 
they are likely to be closely related in consumption.  Accordingly, if its legalisation causes 
marijuana consumption to change, consequential changes in drinking patterns could also be 
expected.  In particular, as consumers are likely to regard marijuana and alcohol as substitutes, 
an increase in the usage of the former would probably coincide with a reduction of the latter.  As 
in Daryal’s (2002) survey there is only limited evidence available on the impact of legalisation 
of marijuana on drinking, in the next sub-section we present a model that highlights the 
interrelationship of marijuana and alcohol consumption.  Under certain assumptions, the model 
can be used to provide projections of changes in alcohol consumption following legalisation. 
Exogenous Shocks and Related Goods 
The interaction of goods in the consumer’s utility function, as well as the operation of 
the budget constraint, means that a shock that affects the consumption of one product will have 
ramifications for the demand for related products. Thus while hot weather may well stimulate 
ice-cream sales, it would probably do so at the expense of other products; similarly, low-carb 
diets reduce the consumption of bread, pasta, etc., but have the effect of increasing other food 
items.  In this sub-section, we use the substitutability between goods to model the transmission 
to other products of a consumption shock to one product.  This framework will be employed in  
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the next sub-section to analyse the possible impact on drinking of legalisation of marijuana 
consumption.
36   
In conventional consumption theory, the consumer chooses the quantity vector 
] q ,..., q [ n 1 ′ = q  to maximise the utility function  ) ( u q  subject to the budget constraint  M = ′q p , 
where  ] p ,..., p [ n 1 = ′ p   is the price vector, and M is total expenditure (“income” for short).  This 
leads to a system of Marshallian demand equations of the form  ) , M ( p q q = .  Consider now an 
extended version of this theory in which some scalar shift variable  s  affects tastes, so that the 
utility function now becomes   ) s , ( u q .  The associated demand equations now take the form  
) , M , s ( p q q = ,  which we approximate for good  i  as 
 
(8.1)                                                 
n
ii i i j j
j1
Dq Ds DM Dp
∗
=
=α +η + η ∑ , 
 
where D is the log-change operator;  i α  is the elasticity of the consumption of good  i  with 
respect to the shift variable  s;  i η  is the i
th  income elasticity; and  ij
∗ η  is the  ) j , i (
th  
uncompensated price elasticity.   
Let   ij η  be the  ) j , i (
th  compensated price elasticity and  M q p w i i i =  be the budget 
share of  i, so that   ij ij j i w
∗ η = η − η ,  which is the Slutsky equation.  Defining the change in real 
income as  ∑ = − =
n
1 i i i Dp w DM DQ  and using the Slutsky equation, we can then express 
equation (8.1) as: 
(8.2)                                                  ∑
=
η + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DQ Ds Dq  . 
We interpret the shift variable  s  as a binary variable reflecting two regimes, such that  Ds  takes 
the value 0 (for regime 1) or 1 (regime 2).  We can then write equation (8.2) under the regime 2 
as 
(8.3)                                                 ∑
=
η + η + α =
n
1 j
j ij i i i Dp DQ Dq  . 
To preserve the budget constraint, the coefficients of equation (8.3) satisfy ∑ = = α
n
1 i i i 0 w , 
∑ = = η
n
1 i i i 1 w , ∑ = = η
n
1 i ij i 0 w,   n ,..., 1 j= .  The coefficient  i α  is interpreted as the log-change in 
                                                 
36 This and the next sub-section draw on Clements and Daryal (2005b) and Clements and Lan (2005).  
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consumption of good  i  resulting from the regime change when income and prices are held 
constant. 
Let  k uq ∂∂ be the marginal utility of good  k  and suppose that the regime change 
causes this marginal utility to increase by  k cu q × ∂∂, where  0 c > , so that  
(8.4)                                                            
k
u
dl o g c
q
⎛⎞ ∂
= ⎜⎟ ∂ ⎝⎠
. 
It is to be noted that the change in regime affects directly only the marginal utility of   
one good, that of good  k.  To interpret  c  in equation (8,4), recall that for a budget-constrained 
utility maximum, each marginal utility is proportional to the corresponding price, 
ii uq p ∂∂= λ, where  λ  is the marginal utility of income.  Accordingly for  i = k, 
() ( ) ( ) kk d log u q d log d logp ∂∂ = λ + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , or in view of (8.4),  k cd ( l o g p ) = , if  λ  is constant.  
This shows that  c  is an “equivalent price change”, the fall in the price of  k  that would yield 
the same increase in consumption of this good as would the original shock.  In the Appendix we 
show that equation (8.4) implies that:  
(8.5)                                                            ii k c α =− η . 
In words, the change in consumption of good  i  due to the regime change is proportional to that 
good’s elasticity of demand with respect to the price of good  k ,with factor of proportionality 
(the negative of)  c.  This is an attractively-simple result linking the effect on consumption of  i  
of the shock to  k  that involves the degree of substitutability between the two goods. Equation 
(8.5) also preserves the budget constraint as 
nn
ii ii k i1 i1 wc w 0 == α =− η = ∑∑ , where the last step 
follows from the aggregation constraint 
n
ii j i1 w0 = η = ∑ , given below equation (8.3).   
Accordingly, rule (8.5) serves to reallocate the fixed amount of income among the  n  goods 
following the change in regime. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates the link between the substitution effect and the shift in the demand 
curve in the log-linear case when goods  k  and  i  are substitutes  (so that  0 ik η>).  With  DD  
the cross relationship between consumption of  i  and the price of  k  under regime  1  , a 
lowering of  k logp  by  c  leads to the movement from the point  A  to  B, and  ii k logq c Δ= − η .  
According to equation (8.5), the regime change causes this demand curve to shift to the left by 
exactly the same amount, so that the point on the new demand curve,  D D ′′ , corresponding to 
the original price must be  C , directly above  B.  
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Legalisation and Drinking 
We now use the information on the effects of legalisation on marijuana consumption, 
together with the price elasticities given in Table 6.6, to yield projections of changes in drinking 
patterns.   
We first apply equation (8.5) for the case in which i = k = marijuana.  The UWA survey 
yields a value of the change in marijuana consumption, presented in Table 8.1, which we 
interpret as αi.  Combining that with the own-price elasticity  0.33 η =− ii  (from the upper panel 
of Table 6.6), from equation (8.5) we obtain the value of  c.  Next, to estimate the change in 
consumption of alcoholic beverages following legalisation, we use this  c-value in equation (8.5) 
for  i = beer, wine and spirits and  k = marijuana, together with the cross-price elasticities given 
in the last column of the upper panel of Table 6.6.  The results are given in Table 8.2, which for 
convenient reproduces from Table 8.1 the marijuana results.  The key results are:  (i) For each 
user group, the consumption of spirits always falls the most with legalisation.  Next is wine, and 
then comes beer.  (ii) The largest fall in alcohol consumption is for the daily users.  The effects 
for weekly, monthly and occasional users are not too dissimilar.  (iii) For all types of consumers 
(Panel H of the table), on average legalisation is estimated to cause beer consumption to fall by 
about 1 percent, wine by 2 percent and spirits by almost 4 percent, while marijuana usage 
increases by 4 percent.  It should however be noted that as the standard errors are relatively 
large, the changes in alcohol consumption are not estimated too precisely. 
 
9.  TAXING MARIJUANA 
 
This section proceeds on the basis that marijuana has been legalised and considers the 
public finance opportunities afforded by the opportunities to tax its consumption.  As 
information regarding marijuana consumption is of necessity more uncertain than that for many 
other commodities, it is appropriate to recognise explicitly this uncertainty in the analysis of 
potential taxation revenue.  This section contains four sub-sections.  The first provides a review 
of the differential approach to consumption theory, which forms much of the basis of the 
subsequent investigation.  Then follows a discussion of how to incorporate uncertainty into the 
demand responses for marijuana and the related goods tobacco and alcohol.  The approach set 
out in that sub-section allows us to draw on the considerable prior research on the consumption 
of tobacco and alcohol and combine it with the much more uncertain information regarding the 
demand responses of marijuana.  The third sub-section contains an analysis of how much  
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taxation revenue is available from marijuana, while the fourth considers the implications of 
redistributing the additional revenue to drinkers in the form of lower alcohol taxes.
 37   
Differential Demand Equations 
The differential approach to consumption theory was introduced by Theil (1980) as a 
way to analyse the pattern of consumer demand with minimal a prior restrictions on behaviour.  
The Rotterdam demand model, which was discussed in Sections 6 and 7, is one member of the 
class of differential demand models.
38  This sub-section sets out the differential demand 
equations that will be subsequently used.  In the interests of clarity, we give a more or less self-
contained exposition of the approach, which means that there is some unavoidable overlap with 
the material of Sections 6 and 7. 
Let  i p,   i q  be the price and quantity consumed of good i, so that if  n  is the number of 
goods 
n
ii i1 Mp q
= =∑ is total expenditure (“income” for short) and  ii i wp q M = is the 
th i budget 
share.  The budget constraint of the consumer is 
n
ii i1 pq M
= = ∑ , and its total differential is 
()
n
ii ii i1 dM q dp p dq
= =+ ∑ .  Using the identity  ( ) dl o g x d xx , = we can write the budget 
constraint as  () ( ) ( ) dl o g M dl o g P dl o g Q =+, where  () ( )
n
ii i1 dl o g P w dl o g p
= =∑  and 
() ()
n
ii i1 dl o g Q w dl o g q
= =∑  are price and volume indexes defined as budget-share weighted 
averages of the  n  price and quantity log-changes.  As the volume index can be expressed as 
() ( ) () dl o g Q dl o g M dl o g P =− , the excess of the change in nominal income over the price 
index, we can identify  () dl o g Q as the change in the consumer’s real income.  Under general 
conditions, we can write the utility-maximising demand equation for good  i  in terms of the 
changes in real income and the  n  relative prices as 
(9.1)                            ()() () ()
n
ii i i j j
j1
w d logq d logQ d logp d logP .
=
⎡ ⎤ ′ =θ + ν − ⎣ ⎦ ∑  
The variable on the left-hand side of this equation, the logarithmic change in the quantity 
demanded of good  i  weighted by its budget share, has two interpretations.  First, it is the 
quantity component of the change in the 
th i  budget share, which can be confirmed by taking the 
differential of  ii i wp q M = , to yield  ( ) ( )() ii i i i i dw w d logp w d logq w d logM =+−.  As prices 
and income are taken to be exogenous in consumption theory, the quantity component of the 
                                                 
37 This section is based on Clements et al. (2005). 
38 In the Rotterdam model (i) the coefficients are taken to be constants, (ii) infinitesimal changes are replaced with 
first differences and (iii) budget shares are replaced with their two-period arithmetic averages.  
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change in the budget share is the endogenous part of the overall change and thus is   
a reasonable choice for the dependent variable of a demand equation.  The second   
interpretation of term  () ii wd l o gq  is the contribution of good  i  to the change in real 
income, () ()
n
ii i1 dl o g Q w dl o g q
= =∑ .  The right-hand side of equation (9.1) is made up of an 
income term,  () idl o g Q θ , and a relative price term,  ( ) ()
n
ij j j1 dl o g p dl o g P
= ⎡ ⎤ ′ ν− ⎣ ⎦ ∑ .  In the 
income term,  () ii i pq M θ= ∂ ∂  is the marginal share of  good  i  which answers the question, if 
income rises by one dollar by how much does expenditure on  i  increase?  As all of income is 
assumed to be spent, these marginal shares have a unit sum.  Accordingly, the income term of 
the 
th i  demand equation is a fraction  i θ  of the change in real income.   
The term in square brackets on the right-hand side of equation (9.1), 
() () j dl o g p dl o g P ′ − , is the change in the relative price of good  j, with the nominal price 
change deflated by the price index  () ()
n
ii i1 dl o g P dl o g p
= ′ =θ ∑ .  This index uses as weights the 
marginal shares, and is thus a marginal price index, which is known as the Frisch index.   
Deflation by this index serves to hold the marginal utility of income constant.  The coefficient 
attached to the 
th j  relative price change in equation (9.1) is  ij ν , which is defined as 
()
ij
ij pp Mu λ , where  0 λ >  is the marginal utility of income and u
ij is the (i, j)
th element of the 
inverse of the Hessian matrix of the utility function.  If  ( ) ij 0 <  0 ν> , then an increase in the 
relative price of good  j  causes consumption of  i  to increase (decrease), and the two goods are 
said to be Frisch substitutes (complements); and if  ij 0 ν = , the two goods are independent.  
These  ij ν  are known as Frisch price coefficients and satisfy 
n
ij i j1 = ν= φ θ ∑ , where 
()
1 log logM
− φ= ∂ λ ∂  is the reciprocal of the income elasticity of the marginal utility of 
income, which is known as the income flexibility for short.  A sufficient condition for a budget-
constrained utility maximum is that the n n ×  Hessian matrix of the utility function and its 
inverse  
ij u ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   are both symmetric negative definite; this means that the n n ×  matrix of Frisch 
price coefficients  ij ⎡⎤ ν ⎣⎦  is also symmetric negative definite.  The pattern of the matrix  ij ⎡⎤ ν ⎣⎦  is a 
convenient way of organising prior ideas about the manner in which the  n  goods interact in 
consumption.    
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Demand equation (9.1) is formulated in terms of relative prices.  For some purposes it is 
convenient to use absolute prices by substituting  ()
n
ii i1 dl o g p
= θ ∑  for  ( ) dl o g P ′  on the right of 
that equation.  The relative price term then becomes 




ij j k k ij j ij k k
j1 k1 j1 j1 k1
n





d logp d logp d logp d logp
dl o g p





ν− θ= ν − ν θ ⎢⎥
⎣⎦






where the second step is based on 
n
ij i j1 = ν =φ θ ∑ .  The new term introduced in the third step of 
the above is  () ij ij i j π=ν− φ θ θ , the ()
th i, j Slutsky coefficient, which measures the so-called total 
substitution effect of a change in the price of good  j  on the consumption of good  i, real income 
remaining unchanged.  The 
2 n  Slutsky coefficients,  ij, i, j 1,...,n π = , are symmetric in  i  and  j  
(Slutsky symmetry); satisfy 
n
ij j1 0, i=1,...,n,
= π= ∑ which reflects demand homogeneity; and the 
nn ×  matrix  ij ⎡⎤ π ⎣⎦  is symmetric negative semi-definite.  We can thus rewrite equation (9.1) as  
(9.2)                                       ()() ()
n
ii i i jj
j1
w d logq d logQ d logp ,
=
=θ + π ∑  
which is a differential demand equation for good  i  in terms of absolute prices. 
Dividing both sides of equation (9.2) by  i w  yields a more familiar demand equation as 
the coefficients are now elasticities: 
(9.3)                                        ()() ()
n
ii i j j
j1
d logq d logQ d logp ,
=
=η + η ∑  
where  ii i w η= θ is the income elasticity of  i  and  ij ij i w η =π  is the ()
th i, j Slutsky elasticity, 
the elasticity of the consumption of good  i  with respect to the price of good  j  when real 
income is held constant.  The n n ×  matrix of price elasticities  ij ⎡ ⎤ η ⎣ ⎦ is negative semi-definite; 
this matrix is asymmetric. 
Stochastic Vice 
We apply equations (9.1) and (9.3) to marijuana, tobacco, alcohol, which we dub “vice”, 
and all other goods, so that n  =  4.  As marijuana is commonly mixed with tobacco and 
consumed “jointly”, we shall take these two products to be complements, at least on average in  
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the sense to be described.  As marijuana and alcohol both contain intoxicating properties that are 
similar in the minds of many consumers, they both tend to satisfy the same basic want, so we 
shall take them to be substitutes on average.  The prior literature regarding the interrelatedness 
between marijuana, tobacco and alcohol is not unambiguous, but a case can be made that on 
balance the evidence points to marijuana and tobacco being complements, and marijuana and 
alcohol being substitutes.  For a review of previous studies, see Clements et al. (2005).  The 
fourth good, “other”, is treated as being on average independent of the three elements of vice, 
which would seem to be not unreasonable for such a large heterogeneous category. 
To allow for uncertainty, the budget shares and the basic parameters of the demand 
system given by equation (9.1) for  i=1,…,4  are all taken to be random and follow truncated 
normal distributions.  The advantage of the approach of treating basic parameters of equation 
(9.1) as random is that the elasticities derived from them satisfy all the constraints of 
microeconomic theory.  The means and standard deviations of these distributions are specified 
in columns 2 and 4 of Table 9.1.  The values of the means reflect considerations of observed 
data (where available) for the budget shares; the prior literature in the case of some parameters; 
and/or what we judge to be “reasonable” values.  The standard deviations are derived from 
specifying plausible confidence intervals that reflect the greater uncertainty  associated  with     
(i) marijuana and (ii) parameters as opposed to (potentially) observable budget shares.
39  These 
confidence bands as set out in column 3 of Table 9.1.  The information in Table 9.1 provides an 
algorithm to compute the Frisch price coefficients, which can then be used to form the own- and 
cross-price Slutsky elasticities, according to equation (9.3) for i=1,…,4, as well as the definition 
of  ij η  given below that equation.  As these price elasticities are non-linear functions of the 
budget shares and the underlying basic parameters such as the marginal shares and the income 
flexibility, we obtain the distributions of the elasticities with a Monte Carlo simulation 
approach. 
We draw 5,000 values from the truncated normal distributions associated with rows 1-10 
of Table 9.1 and use them to compute 5,000 values of the Slutsky price and income elasticities.  
Figure 9.1 gives histograms of the price elasticities in the form of a 44 ×  “matrix” with rows 
representing quantities and columns prices.  For example, the histogram in the first row and 
third column refers to the price elasticity for marijuana with respect to the price of alcohol.  
Moving down the main diagonal, it can be seen that the average own-price elasticities are -0.6 
for marijuana (with standard deviation 0.4), -0.2 for tobacco (0.1), -0.7 for alcohol (0.2) and       
                                                 
39 For the detailed justification of the means and standard deviations of Table 9.1, see Clements et al. (2005).  
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-0.04 for other (0.01).
40  The average cross-price elasticities involving the consumption of 
marijuana are marijuana-tobacco -0.2 (SD = 0.1), marijuana-alcohol 0.2 (0.1) and marijuana-
other 0.6 (0.4).  Figure 9.2 shows that on average marijuana and alcohol both have income 
elasticities a bit above unity, so they are mild luxuries, tobacco is a necessity with an average 
income elasticity of 0.4, and other has an income elasticity of about unity. 
Consider the demand curve for marijuana.  Per capita expenditure on marijuana in 1998 
was $372, while consumption was 0.7873 ounces per capita, so that the implicit price is 
372/0.7872 = $473 per ounce.  These price-quantity values are represented by the point A in 
Figure 9.3, and we take this point as lying on the demand curve.  The other points on the 
demand curve can be derived as follows.  It follows from equation (9.3) for  i = 1  (for 
marijuana) that   () () 11 1 1 dl o g q dl o g p , =η  when real income and all non-marijuana prices are 
held constant.  Denote the observed price and quantity by a second “0” subscript, so that 
10 10 p 473, q 0.7872, ==  and unobserved “new” values by  1* 1* p   and  q .  Accordingly,   
() () 1* 10 11 1* 10 log q q log p p =η , so that  ( ) 11 0 1 1 1 1 0 qq e x p l o g p p . •• ⎡ ⎤ =η ⎣ ⎦   As this equation 
expresses the new quantity in terms of the new price  1* p , the other points on the demand curve 
are obtained by varying  1* p .  To allow for uncertainty in the parameters and data, for each value 
of  1* p  we use the 5,000 values of the elasticity  11 η  described above, and we plot the averages 
over the 5,000 trials.  The role of uncertainty is shown in Figure 9.4, which reveals that the 
precision of the demand curve decreases substantially as we move away from the observed 
price-quantity configuration.  This can be seen even more clearly in the associated distributions 
of consumption conditional on the price, which are given in Figure 9.5.  As can be seen from 
Panel B, when the price is $500, which is close to that prevailing in 1998, the consumption 
distribution is fairly compact around the mean of 0.76 oz, and the standard deviation is 0.02 oz.  
But when the price rises to $800 (Panel C), 60 percent above the status quo, the distribution 
moves to the left, with mean consumption falling to 0.57, while its dispersion increases 




                                                 
40 The mean price elasticities for marijuana and alcohol do not depart greatly from the “rule of -½ ” of Section 7.  
The absolute value of the price elasticity for tobacco is more than three standard deviations below ½, so it could 
possibly be argued that this elasticity is on the low side.  On the other hand however, the mean income elasticity for 
tobacco is about 0.4, much less than unity, which is the value underlying the rule of -½.    
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How Much Revenue Could be Raised? 
In Section 8 we discussed the possibility that legalisation may have the effect of shifting 
the supply and demand curves for marijuana, and lead to a reallocation of consumers’ “vice 
budget”.  To keep matters as simple as possible, in this and the remaining sub-sections we shall 
ignore these possible “legalisation effects” on production and consumption and focus on the 
opportunities to tax marijuana and the implications of such taxation.  This analysis is thus not 
completely comprehensive and should be considered to be illustrative of the issues involved and 
the capabilities of the methodology.  In a similar spirit, we also assume that any tax on 
marijuana is borne entirely by consumers. 
Table 9.2 gives the basic information on pre-existing taxation and consumption.  As can 
be seen, tax accounts for about 54 percent of the consumer price for tobacco and 41 percent for 
alcohol.  The introduction of a marijuana tax would have the direct effect of decreasing its 
consumption, as well as indirect effects on the consumption of related products and tax revenue 
derived there from.  As marijuana and tobacco are complements, the consumption of the latter 
product falls with the marijuana tax and as it is subject to a pre-existing tax, revenue falls on this 
count.  On the other hand, as marijuana and alcohol are substitutes, taxing marijuana stimulates 
drinking and increases tax revenue from this source.  To analyse these effects in detail, let  i p′ be 
the producer (or pre-tax) price of good  i , which is assumed to be constant throughout,  i p b e  t h e  
corresponding consumer (or post-tax) price and  i t′ be the tax rate expressed as a proportion of 
i p′, so that  ii i p (1 t ) p ′ ′ =+ .  Taxation revenue from  i  is   i iii iii Rt p qt p q ′′ = = , where 




= =∑ .  We need to consider two situations, before and after the change in taxation 
arrangements, to be denoted by the superscript   0 and 1 τ =τ = , respectively.  To keep the 
notation as clear as possible, the  τ  superscript will be placed in parentheses, so that 
()
i R
τ  is 
revenue from taxing good  i  in situation (or period) τ, 0,1 τ = .  If 
()
i t




τ  is the corresponding quantity demand, then  
() () ()
ii i i Rt p q
τ ττ ′ ′ = is revenue from  i, and 




= =∑ . It follows from 
3
j1 ii j j d(logq ) d(logp ) = ∑ = η  and   
() ( ) () ( )
(1) (0) (0)
jj j j j i dl o g p d t 1 t t t 1 t ′′ ′ ′ ′ =+ = − +  that consumption of good  i  after the tax change 
can be expressed as    
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(9.4)                                           
(1) (0) 3
jj (1) (0)
ii i j (0)
j1 j
tt
qq e x p  .
1t =
⎡ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ′′ −
=η ⎢ ⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ′ + ⎢ ⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣ ⎦
∑
 
As marijuana is initially untaxed, 
(0)
1 t0 ′ = , and we impose a tax on it at rate 
(1)
1 t′ , while 
holding the pre-existing rates on tobacco and alcohol constant, so that 
(1) (0)
jj tt , j 2 , 3 ′′ == .  
Equation (9.4) then defines the new base, and we use various values of the marijuana tax rate to 
evaluate revenue with the 5,000 values of the price elasticities.  Table 9.3 gives the results for 
revenue in the form of means over the 5,000 trials.  As can be seen, the tax yields a nontrivial 
amount of revenue; for example, a 30 percent rate yields about $86 per capita p. a., which 
represents additional revenue of about one quarter of the pre-existing revenue from tobacco.  
But as tobacco is a complement for marijuana, increasing the tax on the latter causes tobacco 
revenue to fall, as shown by column 3 of Table 9.3:  The 30 percent marijuana tax causes 
proceeds from tobacco to fall from $324 to $303, a reduction of about 6 percent.   
Substitutability with alcohol causes alcohol revenue to rise with the marijuana tax, but as can be 
seen from column 4 of Table 9.3, this rise is quite modest at about 4 percent for a 30 percent 
marijuana tax.  The net effect of these changes on total receipts from vice taxation is given in 
column 5, which following the introduction of a 30-percent marijuana tax, rises from $684 to 
$764, or about 12 percent.  There are two noticeable patterns in the revenue standard deviations.  
Relative to mean revenue, the standard deviations all rise with the marijuana tax rate, and the 
marijuana standard deviations are all substantially larger than those of tobacco and alcohol.  
This reflects the greater uncertainty of the impacts of a tax regime that is more distant from the 
pre-existing one, as well as the greater uncertainty of the underlying data and parameters 
pertaining to marijuana.  Figure 9.6 plots revenue against the marijuana tax rate and as it has a 
(gentle) inverted U-shape, it could be described as a type of “Laffer curve”.  As can be seen, the 
revenue-maximising tax rate is in the vicinity of 50 percent.
41  Panel B of Figure 9.6 illustrates 
the underlying uncertainty of the tax revenues by presenting a type of “fan chart” (Britton et al., 
1998, Wallis, 1999) in which the darker colours denote values that have a higher probability of 
occurrence.  This shows clearly how revenue uncertainty increases with the marijuana tax rate. 
                                                 
41 Revenue from marijuana is  ( )
(1) (1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 1 1 Rt p q e x p t ′′ ′ =η , so that the first-order condition for a maximum is   
()( )
(1) (0) (1)
11 1 1 1 11 1
(1) (1)
11 R 1t p q e x p t 0 t ∂∂ ′′ ′ =+ η η = ′ .  Accordingly, the revenue-maximising tax is 
(1)*
11 1 t1 / ′ =− η .  The 
corresponding tax as a proportion of the consumer price is  ( ) ()
(1)* (1)* (1)*
11 1 1 1 tt1 t 1 1 ′′ = += − η .  Using the mean value 
of the elasticity of 
11 0.64 η= − , 
(1)*
1 t0 . 6 = .  In view of the approximation involved in using the mean (that is, 
ignoring Jensen’s inequality), this value is in reasonable agreement with the revenue-maximising rate of Figure 9.6.  
 
56
The issue of estimating possible revenue from taxing marijuana in a legalised 
environment has been considered previously in several other studies (Bates, 2004, Caputo and 
Ostrom, 1994, Easton, 2004, Miron, 2005, and Schwer et al., 2002).  In what seems to be the 
most widely-cited paper in this area, Caputo and Ostrom (1994) estimate that for the US it 
would be possible to raise $US3-5 billion from marijuana taxation in 1991.  This estimate is 
based on conservative assumptions regarding the continued existence after legalisation of a 
black market that avoided the tax.  For comparison, in the same year tax revenue from tobacco 
and alcohol combined was $22b (roughly evenly split between tobacco and alcohol).  Using the 
mid-point of the above range of $4b, the marijuana tax would thus represent an addition of 
about 18 percent to revenue from vice taxation.  As shown in the sixth element of column 2 of 
Table 9.3, we estimate that the maximum revenue from taxing marijuana in Australia is about 
$A105 per capita, or about  105/684 ≈ 15 percent of pre-existing revenue from vice.   
Accordingly, our revenue estimates seem to be in broad agreement with those of Caputo and 
Ostrom (1994).  In a more recent US study, Miron (2005) estimates that marijuana could 
generate about $US2b p.a. if taxed at the same rate as other goods, or $6b if taxed at a rate 
comparable to that on tobacco and alcohol.  Miron argues that these figures are similar to the 
earlier revenue estimates of Caputo and Ostrom (1994).  
A Marijuana-Alcohol Tax Tradeoff 
Next, we analyse some of the implications of the additional revenue by considering an 
offsetting reduction in alcohol taxes that serves to keep constant total tax collections from vice.  
That is, we shall keep tobacco taxes unchanged and consider a revenue-neutral reduction in 
alcohol taxes associated with the new tax on marijuana, so that the marijuana tax dividend is 
given to drinkers in the form of lower taxes.   
Our problem is to specify the marijuana tax rate at some fixed value, say  
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ = , and 
solve for the revenue-neutral reduction in alcohol taxes.  More formally, the problem is to find 
the new tax on alcohol,  
(1)
3 t′  , that satisfies the following conditions: 
(i)   
(0)
1 t0 ′ =     [Marijuana is initially tax free] 
(ii)  
(1)
11 ˆ tt ′′ =     [Marijuana is now taxed at rate  1 ˆ t′] 
(iii) 
(1) (0)
22 tt ′′ =    [Tobacco continues to be taxed at the same rate] 
(iv)  
(1) (0) RR =   [Total tax revenue is unchanged] . 
Details of the numerical solution to this problem are contained in Clements et al. (2005).  Panel  
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A of Figure 9.7 gives this tradeoff by averaging over the 5,000 trials as before.  As can be seen, 
the tradeoff is negatively-sloped, but since the curve tends to get flatter as the marijuana tax 
increases, the tradeoff worsens as we move down the curve.  This is due to two reasons.  (1) 
Because the higher marijuana tax causes its consumption (the tax base) to be lower, a further 
increase in the rate generates a smaller increment to revenue; and this smaller amount of 
additional revenue is then redistributed in the form of a smaller reduction of alcohol taxes.  
When the marijuana tax exceeds the revenue-maximising rate, the slope of the tradeoff switches 
to positive (but this cannot be easily seen from Figure 9.7).  (2) As it is a substitute for 
marijuana, alcohol consumption rises with a higher marijuana tax, so that the reduction in the 
alcohol tax rate required to just absorb the additional revenue from marijuana becomes 
smaller.
42  The slope of the tradeoff (again averaged over the 5,000 trials) is given in Panel B of 
Figure 9.7.  This reveals that for rates of taxation of marijuana of about 20 percent for example, 
the tradeoff is approximately 1:2, so that a two-percentage-point increase in the marijuana tax is 
associated with almost a one-percentage-point reduction in the alcohol tax.  This reflects 
primarily the differences in the tax bases of the two goods, and to a lesser extent, differences in 
their price elasticities.  But as the marijuana tax increases from 20 percent to, say, 30 percent, 
the slope of the curve falls (in absolute value), from 0.47 to 0.42. 
As the tradeoff of Figure 9.7 is the mean over the 5,000 trials, it represents the centre-of-
gravity effects.  But to understand the underlying uncertainty of these effects, we need to 
examine other aspects of the simulation results, such as the frequencies given in Figure 9.8.  
These show that the nature of the tradeoff is reasonably well defined for low rates of marijuana 
taxation, but uncertainty increases with the tax rate.  This, of course, is to be expected as 
increased marijuana taxation involves a move away from its current tax-free status to something 
that has not been previously observed.  Note that from Panel B of Figure 9.8 there is a hint that 
high rates of taxation cause the slope to become positive, as the revenue-maximising rate is 
exceeded.  Finally, we consider the distribution of the alcohol tax conditional on the marijuana 
tax by analysing cross sections of the “vice mountain” of Figure 9.8.  The left-hand side of 
Panel A of Figure 9.9 presents the conditional distribution when marijuana is taxed at 10 
percent.  As can be seen, the mean alcohol tax is about 35 percent, while the standard deviation 
                                                 
42 It is to be noted that along the tradeoff not only does consumption of alcohol and marijuana change, but so also 
does that of tobacco.  As tobacco and marijuana are complements, an increase in the marijuana tax lowers tobacco 
consumption and taxation revenue from this good; and because tobacco and alcohol are substitutes, a lowering of 
the alcohol tax also leads to reduced revenue from tobacco.  Accordingly, as we move down the tradeoff, revenue 
from taxing tobacco falls unambiguously.  By construction, along the tradeoff these changes in revenue from 




of the 5,000 trials is 1 percentage point.  As the marijuana tax is increased to 20 and 30 percent, 
the mean alcohol tax falls to 30 and 26 percent, respectively, and the standard deviation rises to 
1.5 and 2.6 percentage points, as shown in Panels B and C of the figure.  The increased 
dispersion of the distribution clearly reflects the greater uncertainty of the alcohol tax as we 
move further away from the status quo of not taxing marijuana.  This phenomenon is also 
reflected in the conditional distribution of the slope of the tradeoff, given on the right-hand side 
of Figure 9.9. 
 
10.  CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
By all accounts, marijuana is a popular product.  But it is not a product that is well 
understood from an economic perspective.  What is the size of the marijuana industry?  Is it a 
substitute or complement for other drugs?  What is the price elasticity of demand for marijuana?  
By how much would marijuana prices and consumption change in the event that it were 
legalised.  How much tax revenue could be raised from marijuana?  These would seem to be 
some of the major issues in the economic analysis of marijuana.  In this paper we considered in 
detail a number of economic dimensions of the marijuana industry, including: 
•  The nature of consumers of the product and how the consumption of marijuana 
and other drugs are interrelated. 
•  Intriguing patterns in prices, including quantity discounts, regional disparities in 
prices, and the extent to which marijuana prices have fallen over time. 
•  The likely size of the industry. 
•  The price-sensitivity of consumption, and the degree of substitution between 
marijuana, beer, wine, spirits and tobacco. 
•  The possible implications of legalising marijuana, including the amount of 
revenue that the government could raise by subjecting it to taxation in a manner 
similar to that for tobacco and alcohol. 
As a way to provide an overview of much of this material, Table 10.1 compares and 
contrasts marijuana with other products on the basis of a number of economic dimensions.  
Regarding pricing practices, consider first quantity discounts (line 1.1 of the table).  We showed 
that the price per gram of marijuana falls by something like 50 percent when purchased in ounce 
lots, rather than grams.  But when we standardise for the quantity difference in going from 
grams to ounces, by using what we term the “discount elasticity”, this apparently large discount  
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is of the same order of magnitude as that available for other products, both legal and illegal.  In 
this sense, marijuana is similar to other products. 
Regarding regional disparities in marijuana prices in Australia (line 1.2 of Table 10.1), 
we showed that these were approximately the same as differences in housing prices, but larger 
than regional income differences.  This finding points to the importance of local distribution 
costs in determining marijuana prices.  Unlike “raw” marijuana, these distribution services are 
likely to be of the nature of “nontraded” goods, the prices of which would not be equalised 
regionally.  
The substantial fall in the relative price of marijuana over the decade of the 1990s in 
Australia seems to be exceptional.  The annual average fall in marijuana prices of about 5 
percent is much larger than that of many primary products whose prices tend to fall by about 1-2 
percent p. a. on average.  The fall in marijuana prices is likely to be due to the widespread 
adoption of hydroponic growing techniques and/or changing community attitudes leading to less 
stringent drug laws and a lower level of their enforcement.  Accordingly, in terms of the change 
in its price over time, as indicated in line 1.3 of Table 10.1, marijuana would seem to be 
substantially different to other products. 
The preliminary evidence that is available regarding the price elasticity of demand for 
marijuana is that it is of the order of minus one-half.  This is a reasonable value from two 
perspectives:  (i) The value -1/2 is consistent with the economic theory of the consumer under 
the conditions of preference independence (or additive utility).  (ii) A large number of prior 
studies (at least several hundred) of the price sensitivity of consumption of several other 
commodities also point to -1/2 as the centre-of-gravity value of the price elasticity, a result 
which could be termed the “rule of -1/2”.  Marijuana is not the exception to this rule, as 
indicated by line 2 of Table 10.2.  In view of the all of the above, it is probably fair to say that 
there are more similarities than differences between marijuana and other products. 
Its current illicit status means that marijuana escapes the tax net.  This discriminates 
against producers and consumers of legal products that are substitutes for marijuana such as 
alcoholic beverages, as these products are subject to substantial taxes.  Additionally, as the 
government foregoes revenue from marijuana, taxes on other products are higher than would 
otherwise be the case.  In other words, the tax system provides marijuana with a hidden subsidy 
that puts it in a special category (line 3 of Table 10.1).  But should marijuana be legalised, our 
analysis reveals that considerable taxation revenue could be generated from this source.   
According to our estimates, the Australian government could extract maximum revenue by 
taxing marijuana at a rate of about 50 percent, which is about the same as the tobacco tax and a  
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bit above the average tax rate on alcohol.  Such a tax on marijuana would generate an increase 
in revenue approximately equivalent to 14 percent of the pre-existing revenue from tobacco and 
alcohol. 
The final two elements of Table 10.1 refer to externalities and legal status (lines 4 and 
5).  Although these have not been analysed in the paper, they have important economic 
implications.  Examples of the issues raised by these considerations include, are there external 
effects associated with marijuana consumption, and if so, are these similar to those for alcohol 
and tobacco consumption?  What is the least-cost policy of dealing with the externalities?  The 
economic effects of the legal status of marijuana involve issues of risk, uncertainty and product 
quality.  The current illicit status of marijuana means that consumers (i) are subject to the risk of 
incurring legal penalties, and (ii) face considerable uncertainty about the quality of the product.  
It is also possible that product innovation is inhibited by marijuana being illegal.  These 









To derive result (8.5) we use an extended version of Barten’s (1964) fundamental matrix 
equation in consumption theory.  The consumer chooses the quantity vector q to maximise 
utility  () u, s q , where s is the exogenous shock to preference, subject to the budget constraint 
M, ′ = pq   p  being the price vector and  M income.  The first-order conditions are the budget 
constraint and  u/ , ∂∂ = λ qp where λ is the marginal utility of income.  
Differentiation of the first-order conditions with respect to M, p and s yields 
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which, when combined with (A4), becomes  
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Equation (8.4) implies that the only non-zero element of u is the 
th k , which equals 
() kk cu / q c p . ∂∂ = λ   As the term in square brackets in (A5) is the substitution matrix, it follows 
that  
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where  () () ik i k logq / logp , η= ∂ ∂ real income remaining constant.  Interpreting the left-hand 
side of (A6) as the proportionate growth in  i q  resulting from the regime change,  i, α this 
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DRUG USAGE IN AUSTRALIA 
(Percentage of population aged over 14) 
 
        Drug  1993  1995  1998  2001  2004 
Marijuana         
 Ever  used  34.7  31.1  39.1  33.1  33.6 
  Recently used
  12.7 13.1 17.9  12.9  11.3 
Recent use of            
 Meth/amphetamine  (speed)  2.0  2.1  3.7  3.4  3.2 
  Ecstasy (designer drugs)  1.2  0.9  2.4  2.9  3.4 
 Cocaine  0.5  1.0  1.4  1.3  1.0 
 Heroin    0.2  0.4  0.8  0.2  0.2 
 Tobacco    n.a.  n.a.  24.9  23.2  20.7 
 Alcohol    73.0  78.3  80.7  82.4  83.6 
Note:   For drugs other than tobacco and alcohol, the terms of “recently used” and “recent use” refer 
to usage in the last 12 months.  For tobacco and alcohol, “recent use” means daily, weekly and 
less-than weekly usage.  
Source: AIHW  (2005). 
 









PARTICIPATION RATES 1993-2004 
























































































































































DRUG PARTICIPATION BY GROUPS 
(Percentage of population aged 14 and over)
 
 
 Group  Marijuana  Cocaine  Heroin Tobacco  Alcohol 
Overall   14.4  1.4  0.5  24.0  82.7 
Male 17.14  1.61  0.57  25.04  85.76 
Female 12.42  1.15  0.43  22.45  80.66 
          
Married or de facto  8.61  0.68  0.25  20.03  84.68 
Non-partnered 22.07  3.05  1.04  28.16  80.81 
          
Young kids  12.98  1.27  0.32  26.62  86.52 
No young kids  14.75  1.36  0.52  23.00  82.54 
          
Capital city  15.57  1.70  0.57  23.27  83.44 
Non-capital city   12.09  0.54  0.33  24.37  81.75 
          
ATSI 26.45  2.20  1.10  44.08  76.39 
Non-ATSI 14.30  1.34  0.48  23.24  83.16 
          
Single parent  25.42  1.82  1.20  40.10  83.34 
Non-single parent  13.72  1.32  0.44  22.41  83.15 
          
Working 16.43    1.74  0.45  26.06  89.95 
Studying 24.93    2.05  0.68  19.46  73.96 
Unemployed 28.80    1.60  1.52  42.91  82.43 
Other (retiree/pensioner/home duties)  5.87    0.40  0.39  18.76  74.87 
          
Degree 13.35  1.76  0.33  15.58  88.21 
Diploma 14.49  1.38  0.36  26.04  87.07 
Year 12  19.14  1.79  0.75  27.42  85.15 
Less than year 12  12.27  0.73  0.55  24.29  76.56 
          
Income          
 $0-$9,999  14.78  0.99  0.65  23.07  75.54 
 $10,000-$19,999  16.60  1.38  0.34  28.38  85.74 
 $20,000-$29,999  17.56  1.94  0.52  27.99  89.54 
 $30,000-$39,999  14.40  1.98  0.32  23.57  91.66 
 $40,000-$49,999  14.21  1.02  0.76  23.61  93.72 
 $50,000-$59,999  12.34  1.26  0.21  19.38  92.75 
  $60,000 or more  11.49  1.92  0.14  17.59  94.26 
Note: The percentages refer to participation in the past 12 months, based on the pooled sample from the 
1998 and 2001 surveys (NDSHS, 2001).  
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FIGURE 2.3  
MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION RATES 












































































































































































































































Main Activity        Education       Income
 
 















































FIGURE 2.4  
PARTICIPATION RATES FOR FIVE DRUGS 


































































Note: The bars for alcohol are not drawn to scale.  



































































Note: The bars for alcohol are not drawn to scale.   
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LEVELS OF MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION BY GROUPS  
(Percentage of population aged 14 and over)
 
 
Frequency of usage 
Group  Abstainer 
Infrequent Monthly Weekly   Daily 
Overall 85.60  6.89  1.91  3.41  2.32 
Male 82.86  7.01  2.25  4.70  3.18 
Female 87.58  6.79  1.63  2.36  1.64 
Married 91.39  4.12  1.01  2.02  1.47 
Non-partnered 77.93  10.43  3.04  5.18  3.41 
Young kids  87.02  6.13  1.67  3.04  2.14 
No young kids  85.25  7.03  1.94  3.45  2.33 
Capital city  84.43  7.65  2.05  3.56  2.31 
Non-capital city  87.91  5.11  1.57  3.05  2.37 
ATSI 73.55  9.86  3.29  6.26  7.04 
Non-ATSI 85.70  6.82  1.88  3.36  2.24 
Single-parent 74.58  11.20  3.51  6.37  4.34 
Non-single parent  86.28  6.58  1.81  3.17  2.16 
Working 83.57  7.83  2.03  3.94  2.63 
Studying 75.07  14.10  3.88  5.01  1.93 
Unemployed 71.20  8.51  4.41  8.21  7.67 
Other (retiree/pensioner/home duties)  94.13  2.46  0.71  1.39  1.32 
Degree 86.65  7.89  1.78  2.82  0.85 
Diploma 85.51  6.27  1.74  3.65  2.84 
Year 12  80.86  9.16  2.59  4.44  2.95 
Less than year 12  87.73  5.30  1.65  2.92  2.41 
Income:          
 $0-$9,999  85.22  7.11  2.15  3.17  2.34 
 $10,000-$19,999  83.40  6.82  2.01  4.47  3.31 
 $20,000-$29,999  82.44  8.03  2.14  4.27  3.10 
 $30,000-$39,999  85.60  7.47  1.91  3.29  1.73 
 $40,000-$49,999  85.79  7.87  1.52  3.30  1.52 
 $50,000-$59,999  87.66  7.16  1.47  2.48  1.22 
  $60,000 or more  88.51  7.22  1.24  2.41  0.62 
Notes: 1. These figures refer to the percentages of the relevant population groups engaging in different 
frequencies of consumption, based on the pooled sample from the 1998 and 2001 surveys 
(NDSHS, 2001).  
2. Frequency of consumption is defined as follows: 
Abstainers: not used marijuana in the past 12 months. 
Infrequent: used less frequently than monthly, but at least once in the past 12 months. 
Monthly: used at least once a month, but less frequently than weekly. 
Weekly: less than daily, but at least once a week.  





LEVEL OF MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION 
 






































































































































































































































E. By Income 














































































































SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPATION IN  
MARIJUANA, ALCOHOL AND TOBACCO 
(Percentages) 
 
Participation in consumption of      Probability 
Marijuana Alcohol  Tobacco     Joint  Marijuana Alcohol  Tobacco 
(1) (2)  (3)     (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
    √   1.9      1.9   
  √    55.4    55.4     
√      0.2  0.2     
  √  √   13.8    13.8    13.8   
√   √   0.3  0.3    0.3   
√  √    6.0  6.0  6.0     
√  √  √   7.7  7.7  7.7    7.7   
NONE   14.7      
Total   100  14.2  82.9    23.7   





ESTIMATED CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL PARTICIPATION 





Marijuana Alcohol  Tobacco 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
P(Yi = 1)  14.2    82.9    23.7   
P(Yi = 1| YM  =  1)  100   96.5   56.3  
P(Yi = 1| YA  =  1)  16.5   100   25.9  
P(Yi = 1| YT  =  1)  33.8   90.7   100  
Note:  Yi is a binary variable representing the participation status for drug i (i = marijuana, M, alcohol,  
A, and tobacco, T). 






SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PARTICIPATION IN  
MARIJUANA, COCAINE AND HEROIN 
(Percentages) 
 
Participation in consumption of     Probability 
Marijuana Cocaine  Heroin    Joint Marijuana Cocaine  Heroin 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5)  (6) (7) 
√     13.23  13.23      
  √    0.17    0.17   
   √   0.03      0.03 
√  √    0.87  0.87    0.87   
√  √   0.15  0.15      0.15 
  √  √   0.02    0.02  0.02 
√  √  √   0.30  0.30    0.30  0.30 
NONE   85.23       
Total   100  14.55    1.35  0.50 




ESTIMATED CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL PARTICIPATION  
PROBABILITIES FOR MARIJUANA, COCAINE AND HEROIN 
(Percentages) 
 
Drug i  
Probability 
Marijuana Cocaine  Heroin 
(1)  (2) (3)  (4) 
P(Yi = 1)  14.55    1.35    0.50   
P(Yi = 1| YM = 1)  100.00    8.03    3.07   
P(Yi = 1| YC = 1)  86.23    100.00    23.28   
P(Yi = 1| YH = 1)  90.06   63.54   100.00  
P(Yi = 1| YC = 1, YH = 1)  94.78   100.00   100.00  
P(Yi = 1| YM = 1, YH = 1)  100.00   66.87   100.00  
P(Yi = 1| YM = 1, YC = 1)  100.00    100.00    25.59   
Note:  Yi is a binary variable representing the participation status for drug i (i = marijuana, M, cocaine, 
C, and heroin, H). 





DETERMINANTS OF MARIJUANA  
PARTICIPATION PROBABILITY 
 
 Variable           Coefficient 
Marginal  
effect 
Constant -16.966 (1.088)**  -2.862 (0.153)** 
Year 2001  -0.065 (0.032)**  -0.011 (0.006)* 
Male 0.279 (0.022)**  0.047 (0.002)** 
Married -0.410 (0.025)**  -0.069 (0.004)** 
Young kids  -0.106 (0.031)**  -0.018 (0.005)** 
Capital city  0.020 (0.025)  0.003 (0.002)* 
ATSI 0.208 (0.072)**  0.035 (0.018)* 
Single-parent 0.133 (0.038)**  0.023 (0.010)** 
Working -0.047 (0.037)  -0.008 (0.005)* 
Studying -0.051 (0.046)  -0.009 (0.009) 
Unemployed 0.290 (0.058)**  0.049 (0.004)** 
Degree -0.080 (0.034)**  -0.013 (0.005)** 
Diploma 0.033 (0.031)  0.006 (0.004) 
Year 12  0.008 (0.032)  0.001 (0.004) 
Income 0.038 (0.016)**  0.006 (0.001)** 
Relative price of heroin  0.162 (0.045)**  0.027 (0.009)** 
Relative price of cocaine  0.233 (0.051)**  0.039 (0.013)** 
Relative price of marijuana  -0.121 (0.079)  -0.020 (0.013) 
Age 9.563 (0.555)**  1.614 (0.045)** 
Age squared  -1.550 (0.079)**  -0.261 (0.006)** 
Notes:  1. Standard errors are given in parentheses.   
2. A “*” indicates significant at the 10 percent level.  A “**” indicates significant at the 5 percent 
level. 
3. For a continuous explanatory variable, the marginal effect represents the change in the 
participation probability in response to a unit change in the variable.  For a dummy 
variable, the marginal effect represents the change in the probability when the variable 
changes from 0 to 1.  All marginal effects are evaluated at sample means of all 
explanatory variables. 
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   Parent
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Status






CROSS-DRUG CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS  
 
A. Marijuana and illegals   
Drug Marijuana Cocaine  Heroin   
 Marijuana  1  0.651  (0.023)
**  0.590 (0.044)
**  
  Cocaine    1  0.835 (0.026)
**  
  Heroin      1  
B. Marijuana and legals   
Drug Marijuana  Tobacco  Alcohol   
  Marijuana  1 0.50  (0.011)
** 0.37  (0.017)
**  
  Tobacco   1  0.20  (0.014)
**  
  Alcohol     1   
Notes:  1. Correlations  for marijuana, cocaine and heroin in Panel A refer to error terms of a
trivariate probit model from Ramful and Zhao (2004).  Correlations for marijuana, 
tobacco and alcohol in Panel B are from Zhao and Harris (2004). 
2. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. 







PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FROM FOUR PROBIT MODELS
 
Marijuana, cocaine and heroin    Marijuana, alcohol and tobacco 
Model   Model 
Probability 
UVP MVP  
Probability 
UVP  MVP 
P( ) YM = 1   0.0950   0.0948     P( ) YM = 1   0.1071 0.1066 
P( | ) YY MC == 11   0.0950   0.7943     P( | , ) YYY MAT === 111   0.1071 0.2687 
P( | , ) YYY MCH == = 11 1   0.0950   0.8697     P( | , ) YYY MAT === 100   0.1071 0.0145 
P( | , ) YY Y CM H === 111   0.0043   0.5692     P( | , ) YY Y TM A === 111   0.2312 0.5564 
P( | , ) YY Y HMC === 111   0.0016   0.2308     P( | , ) YY Y AMT === 111   0.8750 0.9732 
P( , , ) YY Y MCH === 000   0.8997 0.9043   P( , , ) YY Y MA T === 000   0.0858 0.1064 
P( , , ) YY Y MC H === 010   0.0039  0.0007    P( , , ) YY Y MA T === 111   0.0217 0.0516 
Notes:   1. All predicted probabilities are evaluated at sample means of the whole population.  
2. UVP denotes univariate probit; MVP denotes multivariate probit. 
3. Standard errors are not presented, but can be found in the original papers. 
Source:  For marijuana, cocaine and heroin, Ramful and Zhao (2004); for marijuana, tobacco and 








MARGINAL EFFECTS ON SELECTED PROBABILITIES FOR MARIJUANA 
 
Age squared  -0.261** -0.246** -0.134**  -0.165**  -0.259** 
Probability 
Variable 
P(M=1) P(M=1|C=0,H=0) P(M=1|C=1,H=1)   P(M=1|C=1)  P(M=1|H=1) 
Constant  -2.862** -2.667** -0.713 -1.096  -1.604 
Year  2001  -0.011*  -0.011** -0.013 -0.052**  0.028 
Male 0.047** 0.046**  0.049** 0.077**  0.056** 
Married -0.069** -0.065**  -0.036**  -0.049**  -0.064** 
Young kids  -0.018** -0.017**  -0.024*  -0.012  -0.061** 
Capital city  0.003*  0.001  -0.038**  -0.069**  -0.019 
ATSI 0.035*  0.034**  0.053*  0.052  0.096 
Single-parent 0.023** 0.022** 0.027*  0.055**  0.012 
Working -0.008*  -0.008  0.002  -0.020  0.031 
Studying  -0.009 -0.009  -0.009  -0.048*  0.036 
Unemployed  0.049** 0.048** 0.071**  0.094**  0.098** 
Degree -0.013** -0.013**  0.004  -0.034*  0.053** 
Diploma  0.006 0.006  0.024*  0.001  0.070** 
Year 12  0.001 0.002  0.019  0.003  0.051** 
Income  0.006** 0.006** -0.002 -0.020**  0.023* 
Relative price of heroin 0.027** 0.028**  0.064**  0.109**  0.049 
Relative price of cocaine  0.039** 0.039** 0.055**  0.078**  0.068* 
Relative of marijuana  -0.020 -0.024*  -0.126** -0.131**  -0.198* 
Age 1.614** 1.517**  0.743**  0.934**  1.477** 
Notes:  1. A “*” indicates significant at the 10 percent level and a “**” indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 
2. Standard errors are not presented, but can be found in the original paper. 





FIGURE 3.2  
 
MARGINAL EFFECTS ON CONDITIONAL AND 
 UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES OF MARIJUANA PARTICIPATION 
 





















































































RESULTS FOR SEQUENTIAL MODEL FOR MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION 
 
Participation   Level of consumption  
(Conditional on participation)  Variable 




  Coefficient  Infrequent   Monthly   Weekly     Daily 
Constant  8.77*      4.77        
Year 1998  0.34*  0.07 *    0.26*  -0.11*  0.00   0.04  0.06 * 
Year 2001  0.42*  0.07 *    0.39*  -0.16*  0.01   0.06  0.09 * 
Male  0.28*  0.05 *    0.31*  -0.13*  0.00   0.05  0.07 * 
Married  -0.35*  -0.07 *    0.03  -0.01*  0.00   0.00  0.01  
Capital city  0.07*  0.01 *    -0.09*  0.04*  0.00   -0.01  -0.02  
ATSI  0.15*  0.03 *    -0.04  0.01*  0.00   -0.01  -0.01  
Working  0.18*  0.03 *    -0.11*  0.05*  0.00   -0.02  -0.03  
Studying  -0.11*  -0.02 *    -0.37*  0.15*  -0.01   -0.06  -0.07  
Unemployed  0.39*  0.09 *    0.05  -0.02*  0.00   0.01  0.01  
Degree  0.04  0.01     -0.35*  0.14*  -0.01   -0.06  -0.07  
Diploma  0.08*  0.01 *    -0.08*  0.03*  0.00   -0.01  -0.02  
Year 12  -0.01  0.00     -0.16*  0.07*  0.00   -0.03  -0.04  
Log income  -0.57*  -0.10 *    -1.68*  0.67*  -0.02   -0.26  -0.38 * 
English at home  0.58*  0.08 *    0.03*  -0.01*  0.00   0.01  0.01  
School  -0.77*  -0.09 *    -0.34*  0.14*  -0.01   -0.06  -0.07  
Dependent child  -0.01  0.00     -0.02  0.01  0.00   0.00  0.00  
DECRIM  0.13*  0.02 *    0.16*  -0.06*  0.00   0.02  0.04  
Log alcohol price  1.13  0.21     6.55  -2.61  0.10   1.02*  1.49  
Log marijuana price  -1.64*  -0.30 *    -0.51  0.21  -0.01   -0.08  -0.12  
Log tobacco price  -8.8* -1.61  *    -7.78  3.10  -0.11   -1.21   -1.77  * 
Log age  -14.35*  -2.63 *    -0.37*  0.15*  -0.01   -0.06  -0.08 * 
Note:  A “*” indicates significant at the 5 percent level. 










(t-values in parentheses) 
Coefficients of dummy variables, βu × 100  Dependent variable yrt  Intercept α








u × ∑ =  
I. Marijuana prices 
1. Leaf gram  6.94  -39.80  -46.70  -43.40 -47.70 -38.00 -51.20 -42.90  0.44  44.45 
  (134.60) (-5.46) (-6.41) (-5.95) (-6.54) (-5.21) (-7.02) (-5.89)    
2. Leaf ounce  5.88  7.00  -24.60  -34.90  -3.60 -23.70 -37.90  1.40  0.28  23.56 
  (77.70)  (0.65) (-2.30) (-3.26) (-0.34) (-2.22) (-3.54)  (0.13)    
3. Head gram  7.06  -31.10  -28.00  -40.90 -14.40 -41.40 -27.40 -24.80  0.23  30.96 
  (108.30) (-3.37) (-3.04) (-4.44) (-1.56) (-4.49) (-2.97) (-2.69)    
4. Head ounce  6.26  -20.10  -28.20  -34.50 -33.50 -43.60 -29.80 -13.40  0.28  30.43 
  (106.00) (-2.41) (-3.37) (-4.13) (-4.01) (-5.22) (-3.57) (-1.60)    
II. Income 
5. Gross household  10.11  -2.78  -15.12  -6.98 -13.09  -9.25 -22.06 28.54  0.68  16.23 
  (312.47)      (-0.61)    (-3.31)    (-1.52)    (-2.86)    (-2.02)    (-4.82)  (6.24)    
6. Gross house disposable  9.84  -2.41  -14.56 -7.69  -12.24 -4.96  -21.42 30.34  0.67  16.17 
  (289.02)     (-0.50)    (-3.03)    (-1.60)    (-2.54)    (-1.03)    (-4.45)  (6.30)    
III. Housing prices 
7.  Houses  5.33 -26.94 -47.24 -55.03 -60.63 -33.36 -70.02 -31.72  0.68  48.82 
  (120.30) (-4.30) (-7.54) (-8.78) (-9.68) (-5.32)  (-11.18) (-5.06)    
8.  Units  5.11 -30.80 -38.95 -65.50 -61.85 -37.39 -72.48 -31.42  0.71  51.02 
  (115.40) (-4.92) (-6.22)  (-10.46) (-9.87) (-5.97)  (-11.57) (-5.02)     
   Notes:  1. The regional dummy variable zurt = 1 if u = r, 0 otherwise. 
2. In all cases, the data are annual for the period 1990 to 1999, pooled over the 8 regions. 











REGIONAL DISPERSION OF PRICES AND INCOMES   
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MARIJUANA AND HOUSING PRICES 
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FIGURE 4.4 














































MARIJUANA AND COMMODITY RELATIVE PRICE CHANGES
Note:   Marijuana prices are deflated by the Australian CPI and refer to the period 1991-99.  The other commodity prices are deflated by 
the US CPI and refer to the period 1914-86. 
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INFRINGEMENT NOTICES FOR 
MINOR CANNABIS OFFENCES 
(Rate per 100,000 population) 
 
Year SA NT  ACT  Australia 
1996  1,114            -  96  92 
1997 857  124  103 72 
1998 725  115 76 60 
1999 631  179 49 53 
2000 579  401  - 50 
2001 580  208 59 48 
Mean 748  205 77 63 
Sources: Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Australian Illicit Drug Report   
2001-02, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Historical Population 








ARRESTS AND PROSECUTIONS FOR MARIJUANA OFFENCES 
 
Year NSW VIC QLD WA  SA  NT TAS  ACT  AUST 
I.  Arrests (Per 100,000 population) 
1996 238 421 286 795 141 210 531 47  342 
1997 227 199 441 713 232 245 228 54  304 
1998 245 195 380 633 182 222 253 45  287 
1999 247 198 385 330 172 183 156 28  256 
2000 220 157 386  363  210 62 170  -  242 
2001 211 136 366 389 151 224 223 48  232 
Mean 231 218 374 537 181 191 260 37  277 
II.  Successful Prosecutions (Per 100,000 population) 
1991  112  - - - - - - - - 
1992  123  - - -  273  - - - - 
1993  113  - - -  315  - - - - 
1994  94 - - -  350  - - - - 
1995  83 - - -  326  - - - - 
1996  90 - - -  304  - - - - 
1997  81 - - -  205  - - - - 
1998  85 - -  222  46  - - - - 
1999  92 - -  234  38  - - - - 
2000  77 - -  251  59  - - - - 
2001  73 - -  238  76  - - - - 
Mean  93 - -  236  199  - - - - 
III.  Prosecutions/Arrests (Percentages) 
1996  38 - - -  215  - - - - 
1997  36 - - -    88  - - - - 
1998  35 - -  35    25  - - - - 
1999  37 - -  71    22  - - - - 
2000  35 - -  69    28  - - - - 
2001  35 - -  61    51  - - - - 
Mean  36 - -  59    72  - - - - 
Notes:  1. Arrests exclude the issuing of Cannabis Expiation Notices, Simple Cannabis Offence Notices and
Infringement Notices, which are used in SA, NT and ACT. For details of these, see Table      4.2. 
2. The arrests data for 1996 for SA seem to be problematic and need to be treated with caution.
According to Australian Illicit Drug Report 2000-2001, arrests were 2,076, which when divided by
the population of SA of 1,474,253 yields 141 per 100,000, as reported above.  However, according
to the 2001-2002 edition of the above-mentioned publication, arrests for the same state in the same
year were 18,477, or 1,253 per 100,000.  We used the 141 figure as it appeared to be more
consistent with data for adjacent years; however, the use of this figure leads to a
prosecutions/arrests rate of 215%, as reported in Panel III of this table. 
Sources:  Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence, Australian Illicit Drug Report 2000-2001,  NSW
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, NSW Criminal Courts Statistics, 1991-2001, Office of
Crime Statistics and Research, Crime and Justice in South Australia, 1992-2001, The University of
WA Crime Research Centre, Crime and Justice Statistics for Western Australia, 1996-2001, and







OUNCE AND GRAM UNIT PRICES OF MARIJUANA 
 
(Australian dollars per gram) 



























HISTOGRAM OF DISCOUNT FOR BULK 
BUYING OF MARIJUANA 
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HISTOGRAM OF DISCOUNT ELASTICITIES 
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DISCOUNT ELASTICITIES FOR HEROIN 
 
             Elasticity  


















































                  Source: Derived from Brown and Silverman (1974, Table 2). 








DISCOUNT ELASTICITIES FOR ILLICIT DRUGS 
 
           Elasticity  























           Source:  Derived from Caulkins and Padman (1993, Tables 3 and 4). 
 
 
 TABLE 5.1 
 
DISCOUNT ELASTICITIES FOR GROCERIES 
 (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Product group  Discount elasticities 
  With product  
dummies 
Without product  
dummies 
(1) (2)  (3) 
        
Baked  beans  -0.419 (0.020)  -0.383 (0.027) 
Cheese  -0.183 (0.016)  -0.176 (0.020) 
Flour  -0.259 (0.052)  -0.232 (0.079) 
Milk  -0.151 (0.024)  -0.149 (0.040) 
Rice  -0.122 (0.012)  -0.140 (0.018) 
Sugar  -0.148 (0.033)  -0.296 (0.048) 
Canned  vegetables  -0.308 (0.019)  -0.388 (0.037) 
        
Mean-unweighted -0.227    -0.252   
Mean-weighted 
 
-0.219   -0.237  
Notes:   1. These elasticities are estimated from the equation  si i logp =α+β logs productdummies ′ ′ + , 
where  si p′  is the unit price of product  i   sold in the form of package size s .  








        
QUANTITIES CONSUMED AND PRICES OF 
        
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
        
        
Year Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
        
       
Quantities 
        
1988 141.4  25.82  3.993  .6467 
        
1989 141.6  24.32  4.048  .7049 
        
1990 139.9  22.85  3.870  .7652 
        
1991 134.9  23.01  3.614  .8278 
        
1992 127.8  23.23  3.595  .7695 
        
1993 123.8  23.14  3.982  .7090 
        
1994 122.1  23.19  4.168  .7120 
        
1995 120.2  22.96  4.130  .6913 
        
1996 118.7  23.29  4.106  .7442 
        
1997 117.6  24.18  4.158  .7575 
        
1998 116.9  24.63  4.318  .7875 
        
Mean 127.2  23.69  4.000  .7378 
        
Prices 
        
1988 2.819  6.190  30.578  450 
        
1989 2.928  6.607  33.315  450 
        
1990 3.116  6.801  36.601  450 
        
1991 3.271  6.883  39.064  450 
        
1992 3.361  7.056  40.532  450 
        
1993 3.478  7.271  41.847  450 
        
1994 3.583  7.597  43.044  450 
        
1995 3.724  7.983  44.254  450 
        
1996 3.891  8.306  45.687  450 
        
1997 3.981  8.559  46.714  450 
        
1998 4.020  8.755  47.088  450 
        
Mean 3.470  7.455  40.793  450 
       
Notes:  1. Quantities are per capita (14 years and over). 
2. Quantities consumed of the alcoholic beverages are in terms of litres; 
and that of marijuana is in ounces.   
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EXPENDITURES ON AND BUDGET SHARES OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
        
        
Year Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana  Total 
        
        
Expenditures 
        
1988  398.41  159.84  122.10  291.02    971.37 
         
1989 414.80  160.70  134.87  317.19  1,027.56 
         
1990 435.91  155.39  141.67  344.36  1,077.32 
         
1991 441.49  158.52  140.76  372.52  1,113.29 
         
1992 429.43  163.93  145.70  346.27  1,085.32 
         
1993 430.66  168.24  166.62  319.06  1,084.58 
         
1994 437.49  176.17  179.40  320.42  1,113.47 
         
1995 447.64  183.32  182.77  311.09  1,124.81 
         
1996 461.75  193.48  187.60  334.90  1,177.74 
         
1997 468.18  206.96  194.22  340.86  1,210.22 
         
1998 470.11  215.61  203.31  354.37  1,243.41 
        
Mean 439.60  176.55  163.59  332.01  1,111.74 
        
Budget Shares 
        
1988 41.01  16.46  12.57  29.96  100 
         
1989 40.37  15.64  13.13  30.87  100 
         
1990 40.46  14.42  13.15  31.96  100 
         
1991 39.63  14.22  12.68  33.46  100 
         
1992 39.57  15.10  13.42  31.90  100 
         
1993 39.71  15.51  15.36  29.42  100 
         
1994 39.29  15.82  16.11  28.78  100 
         
1995 39.80  16.30  16.25  27.66  100 
         
1996 39.21  16.43  15.93  28.44  100 
         
1997 38.69  17.10  16.05  28.16  100 
         
1998 37.81  17.34  16.35  28.50  100 
         
Mean 39.59  15.85  14.64  29.92  100 
         
Notes:    1. Expenditures are in terms of dollars per capita (14 years and over). 








      
LOG-CHANGES IN QUANTITIES CONSUMED AND PRICES 
      
OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
       
       
Year Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
       
       
Quantities 
      
1989     .21  -5.98   1.38  8.61 
      
1990 -1.23  -6.26  -4.49  8.22 
      
1991  -3.65     .70  -6.85  7.86 
      
1992  -5.43     .97    -.55  -7.31 
      
1993  -3.13   -.40           10.23  -8.18 
      
1994  -1.42    .22   4.57     .42 
      
1995  -1.55   -.97   -.91  -2.69 
      
1996  -1.29    1.43 -.57   7.38 
      
1997     -.89   3.73  1.25   1.76 
      
1998     -.57   1.83  3.78   3.89 
      
Mean   -1.90   -.47  .78   1.97 
       
Prices 
       
1989 3.83  6.51  8.57  0 
      
1990 6.20  2.90  9.41  0 
      
1991 4.86  1.19  6.51  0 
      
1992 2.72  2.49  3.69  0 
      
1993 3.41  3.00  3.19  0 
      
1994 3.00  4.38  2.82  0 
      
1995 3.85  4.95  2.77  0 
      
1996 4.40  3.97  3.19  0 
      
1997 2.27  3.00  2.22  0 
      
1998    .98  2.27    .80  0 
      
Mean   3.55  3.47  4.32  0 
       





        
DIVISIA MOMENTS 







































        
        
1989  3.70   1.92   8.49  24.87  -11.53  -.79 
        
1990  4.18     .55  10.97  30.06  -13.67  -.75 
        
1991  2.96     .33   6.39  31.57  -13.71  -.97 
        
1992  1.92  -4.47   1.92    9.34     2.84   .67 
        
1993  2.27  -2.34   2.30  34.02     5.60   .63 
        
1994  2.31     .32   2.45    4.05     -.23  -.07 
        
1995  2.77  -1.75   3.39      .64    1.30   .88 
         
1996  2.90   1.70  3.45  13.43   -6.54  -.96 
           
1997  1.74     .98  1.27    2.81     -.17  -.09 
            
1998    .90   1.81    .56    4.02     -.63  -.42 
        
Mean  2.56   -.10   4.12  15.48   -3.67  -.19 
 






RELATIVE QUANTITY CORRELATION  
COEFFICIENTS 
Good Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
      
Beer  1.0 .15 .61  -.70 
Wine   1.0  .43  -.71 
Spirits     1.0  -.90 




PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND 
      
Good Beer  Wine  Spirits  Marijuana 
      
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
      
Compensated 
Beer   -.17  .03  .06  .08 
Wine   .09         -.36  .13  .15 
Spirits   .17  .13         -.60  .30 
Marijuana   .10  .08  .15         -.33 
      
Uncompensated 
      
Beer    -.37 -.04 -.01 -.07 
Wine  -.31 -.51 -.02 -.15 
Spirits  -.63 -.17 -.90 -.30 
Marijuana -.38 -.10 -.03 -.69 






PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR SELECTED PRODUCTS 
 
Product Mean  Median  Number  of 
observations 
Length of run                Source 
            
1.  -0.46  -0.35  139      Fogarty (2005, Chapter 2) 
 
Beer 
-0.37    10     Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005a, p. 232) 
2.  -0.72  -0.58  141      Fogarty (2005, Chapter 2) 
 
Wine 
-0.46   10     Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005a, p. 232) 
3.  -0.74  -0.68  136      Fogarty (2005, Chapter 2) 
 
Spirits 
-0.57   10     Selvanathan and Selvanathan 
(2005a, p. 232) 
4.  -0.48    523      Gallet and List (2003) 
    -0.40  368    Short run  Gallet and List (2003) 
 
Cigarettes 
  -0.44  155    Long run  Gallet and List (2003) 
5.  -0.41  -0.35  314    Dalhuisen  et  al.  (2003) 
  -0.51    124    Espey  et  al.  (1997) 




  -0.64      Long run  Espey et al. (1997) 
6.  -0.26  -0.23  363  Short  run  Espey  (1998) 
  -0.25    46    Short run  Goodwin et al. (2004) 
  -0.25  -0.21  387    Short run  Graham and Glaister (2002, p. 48) 
  -0.58  -0.43  277  Long  run  Espey  (1998) 
  -0.64    51    Long run  Goodwin et al. (2004) 
  -0.53    70    Espey  (1996) 
  -0.77  -0.55  213    Long run  Graham and Glaister (2002, p. 48) 
 
Petrol 
-0.35  -0.35  52  Intermediate  Graham and Glaister (2002, p. 54) 
7.  -0.35  -0.28  123    Short run  Espey and Espey (2004) 
 
Residential 
electricity  -0.85  -0.81  125    Long run  Espey and Espey (2004) 
8. Branded 
products 
-1.76   337      Tellis  (1988) 
 
          
            
Notes  1.  The other average elasticities of road traffic and fuel consumption reported in Goodwin et al. (2004) and 
Graham and Glaister (2002) are excluded as they are not confined to the demand by final consumers. 
2.  Although the elasticities reported by Goodwin et al. (2004) and Graham and Glaister (2002) refer to “fuel” 
used by motor vehicles which is broader than “petrol” (“gasoline”), for simplicity of presentation of the 







PRICE ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND  
 











Note:     The elasticity values in this figure are the means from Table 7.1.  In those cases where these are multiple means for the same 
product, we use those with the largest number of observations.  The elasticity value for petrol (SR) of -0.25 is from the third 
entry in Panel 6 of the table; electricity (SR) of -0.35 is from the first entry of Panel 7; water of -0.41 is from first entry of 
Panel 5; beer of -0.46 is from the first entry of Panel 1; cigarettes of -0.48 is from first entry of Panel 4; petrol (LR) of -0.58 is 
from the fourth entry of Panel 6; wine of -0.72 is from the first entry of Panel 2; spirits of -0.74 is from the first entry of Panel 
3; electricity (LR) of -0.85 is from the second entry of Panel 7; and branded goods (included only in the “mini version” of the 
figure in the top right-hand corner) of -1.76 is from Panel 8.  SR denotes short run, and LR denotes long run 
. 
Mean = -0.54 
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EFFECTS OF LEGALISATION ON THE  
CONSUMPTION OF MARIJUANA 
(Standard errors in parentheses; percentage changes) 
        
Gender   Gender  Type of 
user  Male Female  All  
Type of 
user  Male Female  All 
                
Daily 21.25  (14.80)  .00  (.00)  18.89 (13.70)   No  longer  4.69 (4.67) .00  (.00)  2.50 (2.48)
Weekly  8.15 (4.07) 11.18 (5.08)  9.32 (3.19)    All users  9.09 (2.28) 6.19 (1.78)  7.79 (1.49)
Monthly  6.79 (3.38)  9.12 (4.07)  8.06 (2.79)    Non-users .19 (.18) .38  (.24)  .30 (.15)
Occasional 10.88 (4.27)  3.89 (1.96)  7.29 (2.35)   All  types  5.55 (1.42) 3.07 (.86) 4.27 (.82)
                         
i logq  
k logp  
D′ 
D′ (Regime 2) 
D





               
EFFECTS OF LEGALISATION ON THE CONSUMPTION OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND MARIJUANA 
(Standard errors in parentheses; percentage changes) 
 Gender      Gender 
Good Male  Female All    Good Male  Female  All 
A. Daily users    E. No longer a user 
Beer  -5.15 (5.15)  .00 (.00)  -4.58 (4.67)   Beer  -1.14 (1.40) .00 (.00)  -.61 (.74) 
Wine  -9.66 (9.83)  .00 (.00)  -8.59 (8.91)   Wine  -2.13 (2.65) .00 (.00)  -1.14 (1.41)
Spirits  -19.32 (19.65)  .00  (.00)  -17.17 (17.81)   Spirits  -4.26 (5.29) .00 (.00)  -2.27 (2.82)
Marijuana  21.25 (14.80)  .00  (.00)  18.89 (13.70)   Marijuana 4.69 (4.67) .00 (.00)  2.50 (2.48)
                     
B. Weekly users   F.  All  users 
Beer  -1.98 (1.73)  -2.71 (2.30)  -2.26 (1.80)  Beer  -2.20(1.68) -1.50 (1.16)  -1.89 (1.40)
Wine  -3.71 (3.31)  -5.08 (4.42)  -4.24 (3.46)  Wine  -4.13(3.23) -2.81 (2.24)  -3.54 (2.71)
Spirits  -7.41 (6.62) -10.16 (8.84)  -8.47 (6.92)  Spirits  -8.27(6.47) -5.63 (4.48)  -7.08 (5.42)
Marijuana  8.15 (4.07) 11.18 (5.08)  9.32 (3.19)  Marijuana 9.09(2.28) 6.19 (1.78)  7.79 (1.49)
                   
C. Monthly users   G.  Non-users 
Beer  -1.65 (1.44)  -2.21 (1.87)  -1.95 (1.56)   Beer  -.05 (.05) -.09 (.09)  -.07 (.06)
Wine  -3.09 (2.76)  -4.15 (3.59)  -3.66 (3.00)   Wine  -.09 (.10) -.17 (.17)  -.14 (.12)
Spirits  -6.17 (5.51)  -8.29 (7.18)  -7.33 (6.00)   Spirits  -.17 (.21) -.35 (.34)  -.27 (.24)
Marijuana  6.79 (3.38)  9.12 (4.07)  8.06 (2.79)   Marijuana .19 (.18) .38 (.24)  .30 (.15)
                   
D. Occasional users   H.  All  types 
Beer  -2.64 (2.16)  -.94 (.83)  -1.77 (1.39)   Beer  -1.35(1.03) -.74 (.57)  -1.04 (.77) 
Wine  -4.95 (4.15)  -1.77 (1.59)  -3.31 (2.68)   Wine  -2.52(1.98) -1.40 (1.11)  -1.94 (1.49)
Spirits  -9.89 (8.30)  -3.54 (3.17)  -6.63 (5.36)   Spirits  -5.05(3.96) -2.79 (2.21)  -3.88 (2.97)
Marijuana  10.88  (4.27)  3.89  (1.96)  7.29  (2.35)    Marijuana 5.55  (1.42) 3.07 (.86) 4.27 (.82) 




DATA FOR STOCHASTIC VICE 
Variable/ 
parameter 













Budget shares   i w         
1.   Marijuana  .02  (.01, .03)  .005  .25  1 w 0 1 < <  
2.   Tobacco  .02  (.015, .025)  .0025 .125  1 w 0 2 < <  
3.   Alcohol  .04  (.03, .05)  .005  .125  1 w 0 3 < <  
4.   Other  .92  (.905, .935)  .0075  .008  1 w 0 4 < < ,  ∑ − = =
3
1 i i 4 w 1 w  
      Sum  1.00         
Income flexibility        
5.  φ  -.5  (-.75,  -.25)  .  125  .25  0 < φ  
Correlation coefficient        
6.  ρ  -.5  (-1.00,.00)  .25  .50  0 1 < ρ < −  
Marginal shares   i θ         
7.   Marijuana  .024  (.000, .048)  .012   .50  0 1 > θ  
8.   Tobacco  .008  (.004, .012)  .002  . 25  0 2 > θ  
9.   Alcohol  .04     (.02,  .06)  .01  . 25  0 3 > θ  
10. Other  .928   (.896,  .96)  .016  .017  0 4 > θ ,    ∑ θ − = θ =
3
1 i i 4 1  
      Sum  1.00         
Frisch price coefficient matrix ν       
 
 
                             
12 α=ρ φ θθ  
ν   negative definite 
 
Notes:  1. The range for each variable given in column 3 is the approximate 95 percent confidence interval 
based on  normality. 
2. The parameter 
12 11 22 ρ ≈− ν ν ν   is a type of correlation coefficient for the relevant elements of 
−1 ν , so its value determines the degree of complementarity between marijuana and tobacco where 

















α + θ φ α − α −
α − θ φ α
















SIMULATED SLUTSKY PRICE ELASTICITIES 
        





































































































































































































































































































































































SIMULATED INCOME ELASTICITIES 


























































































THE MARIJUANA DEMAND CURVE 
(Mean over 5,000 trials) 
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THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE DEMAND CURVE 
 

































CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION 
(Ounces per capita) 































































































































































































1.  Consumption expenditure 









2.  Tax rate   









3. Tax revenue 









Notes:  1. Consumption expenditure refers to the year 1998 and is from Clements et al. (2005). 
2. The tax rate for tobacco is derived from excise and customs revenue published in the Australian 
Institute of Health and Welfare Statistics on Drug Use in Australia 2002, Tables 2.5 and 2.6, as well 
as consumption data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Cat. No. 5206.0 
3. The tax rate for alcohol is derived from Selvanathan and Selvanathan (2005a) as follows. In their 
Table 11.12 (page 319), the Selvanathans report for Australia the following taxes (as percentages of 
consumer prices): Beer 43 percent, wine 23 percent and spirits 55 percent. The corresponding 
conditional budget shares (×100) for 1998, from Clements et al. (2005), are 55, 23 and 22 (in the 
same order). Thus a budget-share weighted average tax rate for alcohol as a whole is .55 × 43 + .23 
× 23 + .22 × 55 = 41 percent, as reported in row 2 of column 4 above. 
4. Tax revenue is the product of the corresponding tax rate and consumption expenditure. 






REVENUE FROM TAXING MARIJUANA 
 
Tax revenue (dollars per capita)  Marijuana  
tax rate 










0  0 -  324 -  360 -  684 - 
10  35 (1)  318 (4)  364 (2)  717 (3) 
20  64 (6)  311 (8)  369 (5)  744 (8) 
30  86  (13) 303  (13) 376  (9) 764  (15) 
40  100 (23)  292 (19)  385 (15)  776 (25) 
50  105 (34)  277 (27)  397 (23)  779 (36) 
60  98 (46)  257 (37)  418 (37)  773 (46) 
70  79 (54)  228 (50)  455 (65)  763 (52) 
Note:  The elements in the table are the means over the 5,000 trials and the corresponding standard 






THE MARIJUANA LAFFER CURVE 
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Note:  Panel A plots the means over the 5,000 trials. In Panel B, the boundaries of 
the fan chart are the 10, 20, …, 90 percentiles of the distribution of tax 
revenues from the simulation, so that the solid lines are the medians, 











(Dollars per capita) 
Marijuana tax 
rate t1 × 100 
Marijuana tax 






THE ALCOHOL-MARIJUANA TAX TRADEOFF 
(Means over 5,000 trials) 
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3 t 100 ×  
Slope ×100 
Marijuana tax 
1 t 100 ×  
Marijuana tax 





THE UNCERTAINTY OF THE TRADEOFF  
 




















Marijuana tax t1  × 100 
Marijuana tax t1 × 100 
Alcohol tax t3  × 100 







CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALCOHOL TAX AND SLOPE OF TRADEOFF 
  
Alcohol tax rate × 100  Slope of tradeoff × 100 
  
































































































































































































































Mean = 35.2 
SD = 1.0 
Mean = -52.5 
SD = 7.0 
Mean = 30.4 
SD = 1.5 
Mean = -46.8 
SD = 10.8 
Mean = 26.0 
SD = 2.6  Mean = -42.5 
SD = 16.6








HOW DIFFERENT IS MARIJUANA? 
 
Comparison with other products  Economic dimension 
of marijuana  Similarity Difference 
1. Pricing       
1.1 Quantity discounts    Similar to other products   
1.2 Regional differences    Similar to housing    More than income 
1.3 Changes over time      More than many  
other primary products 
2. Price sensitivity of consumption    Similar to other products   
3. Taxation      Currently tax free, but has substantial 
revenue-raising potential 
4. Externalities    Similar to alcohol? Tobacco?   
5. Legal status    Other illicit drugs   
    
 